dissertation philo hegel

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Dissertation philo hegel research proposal methodology sample

Dissertation philo hegel

The idea seems to be that humans in society not only interact, but that they collectively create relatively enduring cultural products repeatable stories, stageable dramas, and so forth within which members of that society can recognise patterns of their own communal life as so reflected. Furthermore, such cultural products themselves provide conditions allowing individuals to adopt particular cognitive attitudes by appropriating their resources.

For Kant, the practical knowledge of morality, orienting one within the noumenal world, exceeds the scope of theoretical knowledge, which had been limited to phenomena. Hegel, however, thought that philosophy had to unify theoretical and practical knowledge, and so the Phenomenology has further to go. Again, this is seen differently by traditionalists and revisionists. Revisionists, on the other hand, tend to see Hegel as furthering the Kantian critique into the very coherence of a conception of an in-itself reality that is beyond the limits of our theoretical but not practical cognition.

However we understand this, absolute knowing is the standpoint to which Hegel has hoped to bring the reader in this complex work. For most of the 20 th century it was not received with the enthusiasm that often marked the reception of Phenomenology of Spirit. First, as a work of logic most have regarded it as radically outdated and relying on an Aristotelian approach that was definitively surpassed in the later nineteenth century—a view promoted especially by Bertrand Russell in the early years of the twentieth.

Recently, this skepticism has started to change. Some advocate that the Science of Logic be read as a first-order ontological doctrine Doz or as a category theory that simultaneously represents structures of being and thought Houlgate b , and so as having very little to do with what has traditionally been known as logic.

In short, taking the logic as a category theory opens up two general lines of interpretation: should the categories be understood as primarily ontological categories, as found in Aristotle, or as primarily categories revealing the necessary structure of thought , as in Kant?

Those, such as the advocates of the revised metaphysical interpretation, interpreting Hegel as basically a metaphysician, typically stress the former, while post-Kantian interpreters typically stress the latter. A glance at the table of contents of Science of Logic reveals the same triadic structuring among the categories or thought determinations discussed that has been noted among the shapes of consciousness in the Phenomenology.

At the highest level of its branching structure there are the three books devoted to the doctrines of being, essence, and concept, while in turn, each book has three sections, each section containing three chapters, and so on. In general, each of these individual nodes deals with some particular category. Reading into the first chapter of Book 1, Being, it is quickly seen that the transitions of the Logic broadly repeat those of the first chapters of the Phenomenology , now, however, as between the categories themselves rather than between conceptions of the respective objects of conscious experience.

Thus, being is the thought determination with which the work commences because it at first seems to be the most immediate, fundamental determination that characterises any possible thought content at all. Whatever thought is about, that topic must in some sense exist. Like those purported simple sensory givens with which the Phenomenology starts, the category being looks to have no internal structure or constituents, but again in a parallel to the Phenomenology , it is the effort of thought to make this category explicit that both undermines it and brings about new ones.

Being seems to be both immediate and simple, but it will show itself to be, in fact, only something in opposition to something else, nothing. The only way out of this paradox is to posit a third category within which they can coexist as negated Aufgehoben moments.

This category is becoming , which saves thinking from paralysis because it accommodates both concepts. Becoming contains being and nothing in the sense that when something becomes it passes, as it were, from nothingness to being. But these contents cannot be understood apart from their contributions to the overarching category: this is what it is to be negated aufgehoben within the new category. In general this is how the Logic proceeds: seeking its most basic and universal determination, thought posits a category to be reflected upon, finds then that this collapses due to a contradiction generated, like that generated by the category being, and so then seeks a further category with which to make retrospective senses of those contradictory categories.

However, in turn the new category will generate some further contradictory negation and again the demand will arise for a further concept that can reconcile these opposed concepts by incorporating them as moments. It is in terms of this category that we can think, along with Aristotle, of a thing having an underlying substrate within which properties inhere and which, unlike the properties themselves, cannot be thought in general terms, but only in terms of the category of singularity.

And yet this will encounter a problem for the determinacy of this underlying substrate— it will have to find determining contrasts that allow it to be determinately conceived. In Book 2 of the Logic we will learn that the category of singularity will rely on particularity just as particularity has been shown to rely on singularlity. Attempting to unravel the intricacies of the patterns of dependence between such categories will be task of this mammoth work, but here a general point might be made.

Hegel only explicitly explores the details of the interactions of these determinations of conceptuality in his discussion of judgments and syllogisms in Book 3, The Doctrine of Concept, suggesting that concerns of logic as traditionally conceived are not as irrelevant to the Science of Logic as often thought.

However, the general point separating his approach from that of Spinoza clearly emerges earlier on. The other basic methodological principle of the Logic will be that this categorical infrastructure of thought is able to be unpacked using only the resources available to thought itself: the capacity of thought to make its contents determinate in a way somewhat like what Leibniz had thought of as making clear but confused ideas clear and distinct , and its capacity to be consistent and avoid contradiction.

For Kant, transcendental logic was the logic governing the thought of finite thinkers like ourselves, whose cognition was constrained by the necessity of applying general discursive concepts to the singular contents given in sensory intuitions, and he contrasted this with the thought of a type of thinker not so constrained—God—a thinker whose thought could directly grasp the world in a type of intellectual intuition.

It is also a science of actual content as well, and as such has an ontological dimension. Naturally the logical structures and processes implicit in essence-thinking are more developed than those of being-thinking. In contrast, the categories of Being-logic seem to govern thought processes that are restricted to qualitative phenomena and their co-ordinations. But distinction between essence and appearance must itself instantiate the relation of determinate negation, and the metaphysical tendency to think of reality as made up of some underlying substrates in contrast to the superficial appearances will itself come to grief with the discovery that the notion of an essence is only meaningful in virtue of the appearance that it is meant to explain away.

In terms of the ultimate conceptual categories of singularity, particularity and universality, this discovery would be equivalent to grasping the idea that the singularity of the underlying, non-perceivable substrate or substantial form is meaningful only in relation to something that can bear the particular qualities that constitutes its worldly appearance.

For Hegel it is the complex modern, but pre-Kantian, versions of substance metaphysics, like those of Spinoza and Leibniz, that bring out in the most developed way the inherently contradictory nature of this form of thought. Book 3, The Doctrine of Concept, effects a shift from the Objective Logic of Books 1 and 2, to Subjective Logic, and metaphysically coincides with a shift to the modern subject-based category theory of Kant.

Just as Kantian philosophy is founded on a conception of objectivity secured by conceptual coherence, Concept-logic commences with the concept of concept itself, with its moments of singularity, particularity and universality. While in the two books of objective logic, the movement had been between particular concepts, being, nothing, becoming etc. S and P are thus meant 1 to be diverse, but 2 to form a unity—a situation we are now familiar with in terms of the Aufhebung of parts in a whole.

Hegel takes this as signaling two ways of thinking of the relation of subject and predicate in the judgment. One can take subject and predicate terms as self-subsistent entities that are joined in the judgment, or one can take the judgment itself as the primary unit that splits into subject and predicate terms. This in fact coincides with the two different ways in which logical relations have been conceived in the history of philosophy: the former represents the term-logical approach characteristic of Aristotle, while the latter represents the propositional approach characteristic of the Stoics and much recent philosophy.

From the former point of view one thinks of the subject term as designating a substance, typically grasped as an instance of a kind, in which properties, designated by predicate terms, inhere. From the latter point of view, one thinks of predicate terms as abstract universals that subsume or are satisfied by entities to which the subject terms refer, an approach which conceives of the propositional content, in Stoic terminology—the lecton , the what-is-said —as having a primacy over the parts.

Using a distinction from the Medievals, we can describe the first type of judgments as de re about things and the second as de dicto about sayings. These alternative joining and splitting approaches can in turn be applied to the relationship of judgments within inferences or syllogisms. In contrast with Kant, Hegel seems to go beyond a transcendental deduction of the formal conditions of experience and thought and to a deduction of their material conditions.

Such a psychologistic attitude was opposed by Hegel just as it was opposed by a figure as central to modern logic as Gottlob Frege. For Frege, thoughts are not mental, rather they are abstract entities like numbers, so the problem facing us is not how to go from mental contents to the concrete world, it is how to go from abstract to concrete ones.

In fact Bertrand Russell had, at points in his career, entertained such an idea of propositional content itself. Thus when Hegel characterizes some judgment structures typically perception based judgments as judgments of existence one might take the perceived thing itself as straightforwardly part of the content of the judgment. It is a concrete object, but not grasped as a concrete simple , but grasped in relation to what is judged of it in the predicate.

And to the extent that judgments can be considered components of syllogisms, we might appreciate how syllogisms might have become contentful in a process that has culminated in the concrete syllogism of necessity. In the Phenomenology it turned out that the capacity for a subject to entertain objects of consciousness such as perceptual ones was that such a subject was capable of self-consciousness. It then turned out that to be capable of self-consciousness the subject had to exist in a world with other embodied subjects whose intentions it could recognize.

Formally considered we might think of this syllogism as the logical schematization of the most developed form of recognition in which thinkers acknowledge others as free thinkers. What we see here is a reprise of the conception of logos as an objective process running through the world as had been conceived by the ancient Stoics and neo-Platonists.

But it is now embedded not simply in the world as such—in nature —but in objectivized spirit , in human communities of thinkers. We are now returned to the domain of objectivity that had characterized Books 1 and 2 of the Science of Logic , but we might expect such a return from subjectivity to have effected a change in objectivity as earlier understood.

To cross straight into a consideration of the objectivity of the human world of action and thought—spirit—would be to break the developmental pattern of the logic because thought about such a complex form of objective existence will presuppose thought about simpler forms. And so the starting point for the consideration of objectivity will again be that of the simple object as something immediately grasped by thought.

But this object can now be developed with that elaborate conceptual apparatus that has emerged in the preceding section. This adequate concept is the Idea , which, after tracking through considerations of the living individual and theoretical and practical cognition, emerges as the Absolute Idea. The first part of the Encyclopaedia is essentially a condensed version of his earlier Science of Logic , considered above.

Was not Hegel simply trying to pre-empt the work of empirical scientists by somehow attempting to anticipate the very contents of their discoveries from logical considerations alone? Krug is mentioned explicitly in a footnote at this point. In these sciences the empirical element is the sole confirmation of the hypothesis, so that everything has to be explained.

In keeping with the more general idea that that philosophy attempts to discern or recognize concepts in representations Vorstellungen or empirical appearances, philosophy of nature investigates the conceptual structures that are manifest in the products of the scientific work that is done on the basis of those appearances. Traces of conceptual determination will certainly survive in the most particularized product, although they will not exhaust its nature.

Clearly, philosophy of nature is not in competition with the empirical natural sciences; it takes as its subject matter the results of those sciences in order to discover within them the particular ways in which the necessary categorial structures deduced in the logic are expressed. In terms of topics treated, the Philosophy of Nature largely coincides with those treated in the third book of the Science of Logic when the logical processes and relations in question have returned to objectivity after the excursion into the subjectivity of formal logic at the outset of Book 3.

In Mechanism Hegel had reconstructed a movement in thought from a primitive cosmology in which all objects are conceived in relation to a central object the sun that exemplifies objecthood per se , to a system of objects within which any such self-sufficient center has been eliminated. In this Newtonian world, that which gives order to the whole now has the ideality of law, but this is itself thought of as external to the system of objects. In the Newtonian laws of mechanics, however, the unity of matter is still only formal , and in Section Two, Physics, the determinateness of form is now considered as immanent within such corporeal matter.

Matter has individuality to the extent that it is determined within itself by having being-for-self developed within it. It is through this determination that matter breaks away from gravity and manifests itself as implicitly self-determining. While Mechanics clearly reflects the more space-filling conception of matter dominant in British thought, Physics is consistent with the more dynamic continental European conception of matter originating in Leibniz with his idea of living forces.

Within this framework, Hegel attempts to organize a vast array of areas of contemporary physical investigation including meteorology, theories of sound and heat, light and electricity up to and including chemical processes which stand on the threshold of Organic Physics, dealt with in Section Three. From such a conception, the first body to be considered is that of the earth itself , along with its history.

Chapter Two moves to a consideration of the plant and Chapter Three, the animal organism. From the point of view of the actual content of scientific theories and approaches that Hegel summarizes and locates within his system, his Philosophy of Nature is clearly a product of his time.

Nevertheless, many of the underlying philosophical issues dealt with are still now far from settled. Within subjective spirit, we may anticipate that the first division, Anthropology, will follow on from topics with which Philosophy of Nature ends—the animal organism—and so it does.

If soul and body are absolutely opposed to one another as is maintained by the abstractive intellectual consciousness,. The community was, however, recognized by ancient metaphysics as an undeniable fact. The Seele of Anthropology should therefore not be confused with the modern subjective conception of mind, as exemplified by Descartes and other early modern philosophers.

Aristotle had conceived of the soul as the form of the body, not as a substance separate from that of the body, and had attributed lesser souls to animals and even plants. Concomitantly, in this section Hegel describes spirit as sunk in nature, and treats consciousness as largely limited to what now might be described as sentient or phenomenal consciousness alone—the feeling soul. Consciousness in the sense of the modern subject—object opposition only makes its appearance in the following second section, Phenomenology of Spirit, which, reprising key moments from the earlier book of that name, raises a problem for how we are to understand the relation of phenomenology and systematic philosophy: is it a path to it or part of it?

Given that the recognitive approach to self-consciousness presupposes that potential self-consciousnesses are in fact embodied and located in the world, we would expect the mind as treated in Psychology to be no less embodied as the way in which it is conceived in Anthropology. What in fact distinguishes the mind of Psychology from that of Anthropology is its rational capacities, considered in terms that would now be described as normative rather than simply naturalistic, and this for Hegel clearly signals a difference in the way in which an actual psychological subject relates to his or her own body.

The type of abstractive thinking found in Psychology does not, of course, as in mythical images of metempsychosis—a favorite trope of Platonists—involve the mind leaving the body. This would count for Hegel as a piece of mythical picture thinking—a Vorstellung. Rather, it involves a certain capacity of the psychological subject to suspend unreflected-upon endorsement of the claims made on behalf of his or her body, for example, to subject the evidence given by the senses to rational scrutiny.

In this sense, we are witnessing within another mode, the type of progression seen in the movement in Phenomenology from shapes of consciousness to shapes of spirit. The internal Phenomenology of Spirit seems to play an important role in setting up this transition from Psychology to Objective Spirit Williams , but it might also be seen as crucial in relating the more cognitive dimensions of Psychology back to the theme of embodiment prominent in Anthropology Nuzzo a.

Thus any naturalistic analysis is ultimately surpassed by a social and historical one, which itself cannot be understood as anti -naturalistic. The philosophy of subjective spirit passes over into that of objective spirit , which concerns the objective patterns of social interaction and the cultural institutions within which spirit is objectified.

The Philosophy of Right as it is more commonly called can be read as a political philosophy that stands independently of the system Tunick , despite the fact that Hegel intended it to be read against the background of the developing conceptual determinations of the Logic.

The text proper starts from the conception of a singular willing subject grasped from the point of view of its individual self-consciousness as the bearer of abstract right. While this conception of the individual willing subject possessing some kind of fundamental rights was in fact the starting point of many modern political philosophies such as that of Locke, for example the fact that Hegel commences here does not testify to any ontological assumption that the consciously willing and right-bearing individual is the basic atom from which all society can be understood as constructed—an idea at the heart of standard social contract theories.

Just as the categories of the Logic develop in a way meant to demonstrate that what had at the start been conceived as simple is in fact only made determinate in virtue of its being a functional part of some larger structure or process, here too it is meant to be shown that any simple willing and right-bearing subject only gains its determinacy in virtue of a place it finds for itself in a larger social, and ultimately historical, structure or process.

Thus, even a contractual exchange the minimal social interaction for contract theorists is not to be thought simply as an occurrence consequent upon the existence of two beings with natural animal wants and some natural calculative rationality, as in Hobbes, say; rather, the system of interaction within which individual exchanges take place the economy will be treated holistically as a culturally-shaped form of social life within which the actual wants of individuals as well as their reasoning powers are given determinate forms.

Hegel is well aware of the distinctive modernity of this form of social-life. Here too it becomes apparent that Hegel, taking up themes from the Phenomenology, follows Fichte in treating property in terms of a recognitive analysis of the nature of such a right. Such an interactive constitution of the common will means that for Hegel that the identity among wills is achieved because of not in spite of co-existing differences between the particular wills of the subjects involved: while contracting individuals both will the same exchange, at a more concrete level, they do so with different ends in mind.

Each wants something different from the exchange. This dependence shows how anthropological determinations do not simply disappear with the development of more psychological ones—they are preserved as well as negated as in the pattern of what is aufgehoben. It also shows the mutual dependence of the determinations of the singularity of the atomistic subjects of civil society and their particularity as members parts of holistically conceived families.

These two opposite but interlocking principles of social existence provide the basic structures in terms of which the component parts of the modern state are articulated and understood. As both contribute particular characteristics to the subjects involved in them, part of the problem for the rational state will be to ensure that each of these two principles mediates the other, each thereby mitigating the one-sidedness of the other.

Thus, individuals who encounter each other in the external relations of the market place and who have their subjectivity shaped by such relations also belong to families where they are subject to opposed influences. As the estates of civil society group their members according to their common interests, and as the deputies elected from the estates to the legislative bodies give voice to those interests within the deliberative processes of legislation, the outcome of this process might give expression to the general interest.

To declare that for Hegel the monarch plays only a symbolic role here is to miss the fundamentally idealist complexion of his political philosophy. The expression of the general will in legislation cannot be thought of as an outcome of some quasi-mechanical process: it must be willed.

If legislation is to express the general will, citizens must recognize it as expressing their wills; and this means, recognising it as willed. Thus while Hegel is critical of standard social contract theories, his own conception of the state is still clearly a complicated transformation of those of Rousseau and Kant. From within the type of consciousness generated within civil society, in which individuals are grasped as bearers of rights abstracted from the particular concrete relationships to which they belong, Smithean optimism may seem justified.

But this simply attests to the one-sidedness of this type of abstract thought, and the need for it to be mediated by the type of consciousness based in the family in which individuals are grasped in terms of the way they belong to the social body. In fact, the unfettered operation of the market produces a class caught in a spiral of poverty. Hegel, however, did not draw this conclusion.

Rather, the economy was to be contained within an over-arching institutional framework of the state, and its social effects offset by welfarist intervention. The final 20 paragraphs of the Philosophy of Right and the final 5 paragraphs of objective spirit section of the Encyclopaedia are devoted to world history die Weltgeschichte , and they also coincide with the point of transition from objective to absolute spirit.

We have already seen the relevance of historical issues for Hegel in the context of the Phenomenology of Spirit , such that a series of different forms of objective spirit can be grasped in terms of the degree to which they enable the development of a universalizable self-consciousness capable of rationality and freedom. Just the same dialectic that we have first seen operative among shapes of consciousness in the Phenomenology and among categories or thought-determinations in the Logic can be observed here.

An historical community acts on the principle that informs its social life, the experience and memory of this action and the consequences it brings—a memory encoded in the stories that circulate in the community—results in this principle becoming available for the self-consciousness of the community, thus breaking the immediacy of its operation. This loss of immediacy brings about the decline of that community but gives rise to the principle of a new community:.

PWH: It is a dialectic, however, which only passes through some communities. The actual world is full of contingencies from which empirical historians will have already abstracted in constructing their narratives, for example, when writing from particular national perspectives. Hegel clearly thinks that there is a way of cognitively relating to history in a way that goes beyond the standpoint of consciousness and the understanding—the standpoint of what we now think of as informing scientific history.

From the perspective of consciousness history is something that stands over against me qua something known, but from the standpoint of self -consciousness I grasp this history as the history of that which contributes to me , qua rational and free being. Assembled and published in the years immediately following his death, these were the works through which Hegel was to become known as perhaps the most significant synoptic theorist of these cultural phenomena.

Rather than to attempt to capture the richness of his thought here in a few paragraphs, which would be bound to be futile, I will simply try to allude to how this material is meant to draw upon the conceptual resources noted so far. Hegel was writing in a time of intense development of ideas about the arts. Kant had treated aesthetic experience largely in relation to the experience of the beauty of nature, but for Hegel aesthetics becomes primarily about art. The reason for this is simple: art is an objective medium in which a community collectively reflects upon itself, and the art of historical peoples is to be understood as the attempt to bring before the consciousnesses of its members the totality of what is.

The peculiarity of art lie in the sensuousness of the medium in which its content is objectified. Again, the romantic or modern here will be characterized by the depth of a form of individual subjective consciousness that is largely missing in antiquity. But those in Greek antiquity, where psychological determinations were closer to anthropological ones, had lived with a comfortable felt unity between spirit and body and between the individual and society.

A characteristic of the Greeks was their Heimatlichkeit —their collective feeling of being at home in the world as they were each at home in their bodies. Modern subjectivity is thereby purchased as the expense of a sense of abstraction and alienation from the actual world and from the self—a consequence of the way the modern subject has become related to his or her body in a different way.

The symbolic art of pantheistic religions of the East used natural elements to symbolize the gods of their cultures: Zoroastrianism had taken light, for example, to symbolize the divine Aes I: , and animal worship was found in the Egyptians Aes I: A new form of art will be needed to resolve these contradictions, and this is provided by romantic art.

But the material for this form will not come from within art itself. While Greek art can be understood as simultaneously belonging to aesthetic and religious realms, romantic art results from a fission within the symbolic realm of what in the Phenomenology Hegel had treated as a single category, Art-Religion. The transition from classical art to romantic art represents both a liberation of art from religion and of religion from art and the sensuous.

Thus Christianity, whose rituals centered around the myth of God becoming man in the person of Jesus, had avoided the type of reliance on the beautiful productions of art in the way that characterized Greek religions. The shift from classical to romantic art, then, represents a broader shift between a culture whose final authority was an aesthetic one and a culture in which this authority was handed over to religion, and thus represents a shift in the authoritativeness of different cognitive forms.

While officially declaring that philosophy and religion had the same content —God—Hegel claimed that the conceptual form of philosophy dealt with this concept in a more developed way than that which was achievable in the imagistic representational form of religion. The limitations of Greek at-homeness in the world had to do with the inability of Greek life and thought to sustain that dimension of human existence that is reflected in the category of singularity of the subject.

The fate of Socrates had thus represented the ultimate incompatibility with the Greek form of life itself of the type of individual, reflective individual who could reflectively bring any belief into question and take a stand against convention. Similar incompatibilities could be seen reflected in Greek tragedies such as Antigone. With the decline of the Greek world and the rise of the Roman one, movements such as Stoicism and Christianity would come to give expression to an individual point of view, but under the social conditions of Rome or the Middle Ages such a subjective point of view could only be an alienated one attracted to what, in contrast to Greek concreteness, would be seen as abstractions.

Prior to the modern world there would be no real place in either everyday life or in philosophical culture for any non -alienated versions of the reflective or subjective position that had first emerged with Socrates—no form of life in which this individual dimension of human subjectivity could be at home.

But Christianity marked a type of advance over Stoicism in that its doctrines of the nature of a good life had a this worldly exemplar. In this sense Christianity marked a definite advance over the more intuitively based religious cults to which Hegel had been attracted in his youth, but it would only be in the modern world that the content of the core ideas of Christianity could be given proper expression. These need to become conceptualized, and this happens under modern Protestantism, and this, for Hegel, requires a type of demythologization of the religious content handed down from the past.

Christ must somehow come to stand as an example of the human kind in general, which is the ultimate bearer of the status of being the son of God. Once more, it is the purported singularity of the category son of God that must be brought back into relation to the universality of the human genus. The understanding of what Hegel means by the concept religion in turn becomes tied to understanding what he means by philosophy.

The mere six paragraphs devoted to this science in the Encyclopaedia and dealing almost exclusively with the relation of philosophy to religion were to be expanded into the massive posthumously published three volumes on the philosophical history of philosophy based on various sources including student transcripts for his lecture series given in Berlin.

Tennemann, who presupposed a type of Kantian framework. There is an important caveat to add here, however. Philosophy is often identified with the capacity for abstract thought, and this is not confined to Europe and its history. Rather, it is typical of eastern cultures like those of India and China. As we have seen in the context of art , Hegel identifies Greek culture with a type of at-homeness in the world—what we might think of as the opposite of a tendency to abstraction and its typical attraction to the transcendent or other-worldly.

Greek philosophy, and so philosophy itself , starts with Thales and Ionian natural philosophy. In short, Socrates had added a subjective dimension to the otherwise natural moral lives of Athenian citizens, in that he had challenged them to find the principles not of worldly things but of their own actions , and challenged them to find these within the resources of their own individual consciousnesses. In him we see pre-eminently the inwardness of consciousness that in an anthropological way existed in the first instance in him and became later on a usual thing.

LHP I: Plato and, especially Aristotle, represent the pinnacle of ancient philosophy, but this philosophy, no matter how great, represents its time , that is, the time of the Greek form of spirit, raised to the level of thought.

Neither Plato nor Aristotle can break free in thought from the contradiction between the conception of autonomous subjectivity represented by Socrates and the essential collectivity of Greek culture. Classical Greek philosophy will succumb in the same way that the Greek polis succumbs to its own internal contradictions, and what will eventually replace it will be a type of philosophizing constrained within the doctrinal constraints of the new religion, Christianity.

But Christianity, as we have seen, gives representation to a solution to the problem of subjectivity encountered in the form of Socrates. Philosophy proper only thrives under conditions of at-homeness in the world and such conditions obtained in neither the Roman nor medieval world. Hegel then sees both periods of philosophy as effectively marking time, and it is only in the modern world that once more develops.

What modern philosophy will reflect is the universalization of the type of subjectivity we have seen represented by Socrates in the Greek polis and Jesus in the Christian religious community. In the —6 lectures, from there Hegel traces the path of modern philosophy through three phases: a first period of metaphysics comprising Descartes, Spinoza and Malebranche; a second treating Locke, Leibniz and others; and the recent philosophies of Kant, Fichte, Jacobi and Schelling.

Of course the perspective from which this narrative has been written is the absent final stage within this sequence—that represented by Hegel himself. Hegel concludes the lectures with the claim that he has. Our standpoint is the cognition of spirit, the knowledge of the idea as spirit, as absolute spirit, which as absolute opposes itself to another spirit, to the finite spirit. I am grateful to the section editor Allen Wood for very helpful suggestions and corrections in relation to an earlier draft of this entry.

Life, Work, and Influence 2. Philosophy of Nature 3. The point is expanded upon further when it is said that it is an error on the part of the philosophy of nature to attempt to face up to all phenomena; this is done in the finite sciences, where everything has to be reduced to general conceptions hypotheses.

Elements of the Philosophy of Right The Philosophy of Right as it is more commonly called can be read as a political philosophy that stands independently of the system Tunick , despite the fact that Hegel intended it to be read against the background of the developing conceptual determinations of the Logic.

Philosophy of History The final 20 paragraphs of the Philosophy of Right and the final 5 paragraphs of objective spirit section of the Encyclopaedia are devoted to world history die Weltgeschichte , and they also coincide with the point of transition from objective to absolute spirit. This loss of immediacy brings about the decline of that community but gives rise to the principle of a new community: in rendering itself objective and making this its being an object of thought, [spirit] on the one hand destroys the determinate form of its being, and on the other hand gains a comprehension of the universal element which it involves, and thereby gives a new form to its inherent principle … [which] has risen into another, and in fact a higher principle.

The terminology was largely developed earlier by Fichte. The "thesis—antithesis—synthesis" approach erroneously gives the sense that things or ideas are contradicted or opposed by things that come from outside them. To the contrary, the fundamental notion of Hegel's dialectic is that things or ideas have internal contradictions. For Hegel, analysis or comprehension of a thing or idea reveals that underneath its apparently simple identity or unity is an underlying inner contradiction.

This contradiction leads to the dissolution of the thing or idea in the simple form in which it presented to a higher-level, more complex thing or idea that more adequately incorporates the contradiction. The triadic form that appears in many places in Hegel e. For Hegel, reason is "speculative" — not "dialectical". According to their argument, although Hegel referred to "the two elemental considerations: first, the idea of freedom as the absolute and final aim; secondly, the means for realising it, i.

Furthermore, in Hegel's language the "dialectical" aspect or "moment" of thought and reality, by which things or thoughts turn into their opposites or have their inner contradictions brought to the surface, what he called Aufhebung , is only preliminary to the "speculative" and not "synthesizing" aspect or "moment", which grasps the unity of these opposites or contradiction.

It is now widely agreed that explaining Hegel's philosophy in terms of thesis—antithesis—synthesis is inaccurate. Nevertheless, this interpretation survives in a number of scholarly works. In the last half of the 20th century, Hegel's philosophy underwent a major renaissance. This was due to a the rediscovery and re-evaluation of Hegel as a possible philosophical progenitor of Marxism by philosophically oriented Marxists; b a resurgence of Hegel's historical perspective; and c an increasing recognition of the importance of his dialectical method.

In Reason and Revolution , Herbert Marcuse made the case for Hegel as a revolutionary and criticized Leonard Trelawny Hobhouse 's thesis that Hegel was a totalitarian. Beginning in the s, Anglo-American Hegel scholarship has challenged the traditional interpretation of Hegel as offering a metaphysical system: this has also been the approach of Z. Pelczynski and Shlomo Avineri. This view, sometimes referred to as the "non-metaphysical option", has influenced many major English-language studies of Hegel.

Late 20th-century literature in Western Theology that is friendly to Hegel includes works by such writers as Walter Kaufmann , Dale M. Schlitt , Theodore Geraets , Philip M. Two prominent American philosophers, John McDowell and Robert Brandom sometimes referred to as the " Pittsburgh Hegelians" , have produced philosophical works with a marked Hegelian influence. In a separate Canadian context, James Doull 's philosophy is deeply Hegelian.

Beginning in the s after the fall of the Soviet Union, a fresh reading of Hegel took place in the West. Marx plays little-to-no role in these new readings. Criticism of Hegel has been widespread in the 19th and the 20th centuries. Ayer have challenged Hegelian philosophy from a variety of perspectives. Among the first to take a critical view of Hegel's system was the 19th-century German group known as the Young Hegelians , which included Feuerbach, Marx, Engels and their followers.

In particular, Russell considered "almost all" of Hegel's doctrines to be false. Hegel's contemporary Schopenhauer was particularly critical and wrote of Hegel's philosophy as "a pseudo-philosophy paralyzing all mental powers, stifling all real thinking". A guardian fearing that his ward might become too intelligent for his schemes might prevent this misfortune by innocently suggesting the reading of Hegel. Karl Popper wrote that "there is so much philosophical writing especially in the Hegelian school which may justly be criticised as meaningless verbiage".

Popper further proposed that Hegel's philosophy served not only as an inspiration for communist and fascist totalitarian governments of the 20th century, whose dialectics allow for any belief to be construed as rational simply if it could be said to exist. Kaufmann and Shlomo Avineri have criticized Popper's theories about Hegel. Voegelin argued that Hegel should be understood not as a philosopher, but as a "sorcerer", i.

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. German philosopher — For other uses, see Hegel disambiguation. Portrait by Jakob Schlesinger , Berlin , Kingdom of Prussia. Continental philosophy German idealism Objective idealism Absolute idealism Hegelianism Historicism [2] Naturphilosophie Epistemic coherentism [3] Conceptualism [4] Empirical realism [5] Coherence theory of truth [6].

Main article: Science of Logic. See also: Porphyrian tree. See also: Civil society. See also: Hegelianism. This section needs additional citations for verification. Please help improve this article by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. Main article: Thesis, antithesis, synthesis. Main article: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel bibliography.

Philosophy portal. Daniel Breazeale. In Breazeale, Daniel; Fichte, Johann Fichte: Early Philosophical Writings. Cornell University Press. The Coherence Theory of Truth. Stanford University. II, Meiner, [], pp. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 5 February Journal of the History of Economic Thought. Subjects of desire: Hegelian reflections in twentieth-century France. New York: Columbia University Press. Random House Webster's Unabridged Dictionary. Longman Pronunciation Dictionary 3rd ed.

ISBN Duden in German. Retrieved 18 October Phenomenological Reviews. Retrieved 3 September It does not occur anywhere in The Science of Logic though he comes close in a remark on p. Greraets, Suchting and Harris note in the introduction to their translation of this later text that the term is more strongly associated with English movement in that later part of the 19th century Hackett: , xiii. Translated by Breazeale, Daniel. Retrieved 17 April Systematic Theology, Volume 1.

University of Chicago Press. Jahrhundert , Harper, Herbert L. Hegel, Hegel and the Greeks. Subjects of desire : Hegelian reflections in twentieth-century France. Columbia University Press. OCLC Hegel: A Biography. Cambridge University Press. The Cambridge Companion to Hegel. Phenomenology and System. Lexington Books. Archived from the original PDF on 8 October Retrieved 9 August Hegel, Dissertatio philosophica de Orbitis Planetarum.

Hegel, Philosophical Dissertation on the Orbits of the Planets. Journal for the History of Astronomy. Bibcode : JHA S2CID The letter was not published in Hegel's time, but the expression was attributed to Hegel anecdotally, appearing in print from L. Noack, Schelling und die Philosophie der Romantik , , p. The phrase become widely associated with Hegel later in the 19th century, e.

October , p. Hegel, letter of 13 October to F. Niethammer, no. Hoffmeister, vol. Pinkard A Companion to Heidegger. Wrathall, Mark A. Critique of Pure Reason. Hegel's Science of Logic. Miller, Arnold V. Amherst, N. Hegel's science of logic. Science of Logic. Humanity Books. Arnold V. Humanities Press. Hegel's dialectic : five hermeneutical studies.

Smith, P. New Haven: Yale University Press. Retrieved 23 April Hegel's logic : between dialectic and history. Evanston, Ill. Understanding Hegel's Mature Critique of Kant. Stanford, California. Hegel's concept of life : self-consciousness, freedom, logic. New York, NY. The science of logic. Di Giovanni, George, —. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Retrieved 17 December Retrieved 1 July An Introduction to Hegel's Logic.

Lars Aagaard-Mogensen trans. Hackett Publishing. A History of Philosophy: Volume 7: 18th and 19th century German philosophy. Continuum International Publishing Group. Chapter X. Krug", Kritisches Journal der Philosophie , I, no. Copenhagen : Museum Tusculanum Press — p.

Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press— p. Vickroy and Susan E. Blow—who were both minor associates of the St. The Journal of Speculative Philosophy in print from — was the official journal of the St. Louis Philosophical Society. The St. Louis Philosophical Society—the organization which served as the hub of the St.

Susan Elizabeth Blow — was an educator who in opened the first successful public kindergarten in the U. Louis, Missouri. Speirs and J. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Hegel — A Biography. United States: Cambridge University Press.

George di Giovanni. Kaufmann , Hegel: A Reinterpretation , Anchor, p. Kaufmann, , Hegel: A Reinterpretation , p. Mueller Jon Stewart ed. The Hegel Myths and Legends. Northwestern University Press. Francis Fukuyama and the End of History. University of Wales Press.

Russell, History of Western Philosophy , chapter 22, paragraph 1, p. A History of Western Philosophy. Fraser, F. Muller eds. Instead, I argue that we must understand Hegel as a Hermetic thinker, if we are to truly understand him at all. Adcock, Robert Oxford University Press. Beiser, Frederick C. New York: Routledge. Burbidge, John, Broadview Press. Hegel: A Re-examination. New York: Oxford University Press. SUNY Press. New York : German Publication Society.

Retrieved 24 September Gentile, Andrea, Stanford University Press. Harris, H. Hegel: Phenomenology and System. Indianapolis: Hackett. Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, Houlgate, Stephen, An Introduction to Hegel. Freedom, Truth and History. Oxford: Blackwell Houlgate, Stephen, Purdue University Press.

Paris: Aubier. Inwood, M. Hegel—The Arguments of the Philosophers. Athens: Ohio University Press. Kaufmann, Walter , Hegel: A Reinterpretation. Paris: Gallimard. James H. Nichols, Jr. Kreines, James Lom, Petr Losurdo, Domenico , Hegel and the Freedom of Moderns. Der junge Hegel. Berlin, Maker, William, Philosophy Without Foundations: Rethinking Hegel. State University of New York Press. Luther, Timothy C.

MacGregor, David Hegel and Marx: After the Fall of Communism. Marcuse, Herbert , Mueller, Gustav Emil , Hegel: the man, his vision, and work. New York: Pageant Press. Ng, Karen Retrieved 24 December Pinkard, Terry, Hegel's Dialectic: The Explanation of Possibility.

Temple University Press Pinkard, Terry, Hegel's Phenomenology: The Sociality of Reason. Pippin, Robert B. Hegel's Idealism: the Satisfactions of Self-Consciousness. Plant, Raymond , Hegel: An Introduction. Oxford: Blackwell Quinton, Anthony In Kenny, Kenny ed. Of men and manners : essays historical and philosophical.

Oxford: Oxford University Press. Most reference books say that Hegel died of cholera. There was an epidemic of it and Hegel was worried about being infected. But Hegel's most recent biographer Terry Pinkard argues conclusively that it was not cholera that killed Hegel. He had no diarrhoea and no swelling. It was probably, Pinkard says, 'some kind of upper gastro-intestinal disease'. This detail is characteristic of the immense thoroughness and pertinacity of Pinkard's 'Hegel, a Biography' C.

Riedel, Manfred, Rockmore, Tom Hegel follows Kant In short, he adopts a view very similar to Kant's empirical realism. Rose, Gillian , Hegel Contra Sociology. Athlone Press. Rosen, Stanley, Reading Hegel's Phenomenology.

Indiana University Press. Hegel's Dialectic. Reidel Publishing Company. Singer, Peter , Hegel: A Very Short Introduction. The Routledge guide book to Hegel's Phenomenology of spirit second ed. Abingdon, Oxon New York: Routledge. Stewart, Jon, ed. The Philosophy of Hegel. New York: Dover. Taylor, Charles , Williams, Robert R. Articles related to Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. Continental philosophy.

Hegel's principal achievement was his development of a distinctive articulation of idealismsometimes termed absolute idealism[33] in which the dualisms of, for instance, mind and nature and subject and object are overcome.

Research proposal sample tv program evaluation In this picture, Hegel is seen as offering a metaphysico-religious view of God qua Absolute Spirit, as the ultimate reality that we can come to know through pure thought processes alone. Every member loves the State with genuine patriotism, but has transcended simple "team spirit" by reflectively endorsing their citizenship. Greraets, Suchting and Harris note in the introduction to their translation of this later text that the term is more strongly associated with English movement in that later part of the 19th century Hackett:xiii. OCLC Despite professional cheap essay editor service au seemingly dominant theological theme, Hegel was still seen by many as an important precursor of other more characteristically secular strands of modern thought such as existentialism and Marxist materialism. Hegel takes up the project that Kant suggested is necessary but did not complete, namely "to take note of and, as far as possible, completely catalog" the derivative concepts of the pure understanding and "completely illustrate its family tree. Thus Christianity, whose rituals centered around the myth of God becoming man in the person of Jesus, had avoided the type of reliance on the beautiful productions of art in the way that characterized Greek religions.
Essay celebrity bodies 2008 Hegel recounted his impressions in a letter to his friend Friedrich Immanuel Niethammer :. Brandom, Robert B. Retrieved 3 September Hodgson, and J. Bibliography German Works Gesammelte Werke. A child, in Hegel's example, is thus 'in itself' the adult it will become: to know what a 'child' is means to know that it is, in some respects, a vacancy which will only gain content after it has grown out of childhood. Philosophy of Nature 3.
Dissertation philo hegel Thus, individuals who encounter each other in the external relations of the market place and who have their subjectivity shaped by such relations also belong to families where they are subject to opposed influences. Within this work, the category of life is conceived to be the absolute idea in the form of the subjective concept; an illustrative contrast may be seen in contrasting this with how the category of cognition is thought as being the absolute idea in the form of the judgement. The idea of the absolute excludes multiplicity so the subjective and objective must achieve synthesis to become whole. Rather than to attempt to capture the richness of his thought here in a few paragraphs, which would be bound to be futile, I will simply try to allude to how this material is meant to draw upon the conceptual resources noted so far. Temple University Press Pinkard, Terry, In he managed to return to his university career by being appointed to a chair in philosophy at the Dissertation philo hegel of Heidelberg, but shortly after, inhe was offered and took up the chair of philosophy at the University of Berlin, the most prestigious position in the German philosophical world.
Tips to write a good formal letter Retrieved 18 October The rational, self-conscious whole is not a thing or being that lies outside of other existing things or minds. Hegel seemed to have an ambivalent relationship with magicmyth and Paganism. Inwhile in Heidelberg he published the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciencesa systematic work in which an abbreviated version of the earlier Science of Logic the Encyclopaedia Logic or Lesser Logic was followed by the application of its principles to the philosophy of nature and the philosophy of spirit. I am grateful to the section editor Allen Wood for very helpful suggestions and corrections in relation to an earlier draft of this entry.
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Sample medical writing resume It also shows the mutual dependence of the determinations of the singularity of the atomistic subjects of civil society and their particularity as members parts of holistically conceived families. Phenomenological Reviews. Resume to work at a bar in fact distinguishes the mind of Psychology from that of Anthropology is its rational capacities, considered in terms that would now dissertation philo hegel described as normative rather than simply naturalistic, and this for Hegel clearly signals a difference in the way in which an actual psychological subject relates to his or her own body. It argues that, in recognising the rational principles inherent in society and by transforming the existing world to conform more faithfully to these principles, true conscience plays an essential role in keeping the state in line with its own, rational essence. Edited by Pierre Garniron and Walter Jaeschke. Websites that buy what you know about.
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PERSUASIVE RESEARCH ESSAY TOPIC IDEAS

Hegel's concept of Aufhebung , by which parts are preserved and repurposed within the whole, anticipates the concept of emergence in contemporary systems theory and evolutionary biology. However, Hegel himself describes the system as a "circle of circles:". Hegel's thinking can be understood as a constructive development within the broad tradition that includes Plato and Immanuel Kant.

What distinguishes them from materialists like Epicurus and Thomas Hobbes and from empiricists like David Hume , is that they regarded freedom or self-determination as real and having important ontological implications for soul or mind or divinity.

This focus on freedom is what generates Plato's notion in the Phaedo , Republic and Timaeus of the soul as having a higher or fuller kind of reality than that possessed by inanimate objects. While Aristotle criticized Plato's "Forms", he preserved Plato's ontological implications for self-determination: ethical reasoning, the soul's pinnacle in the hierarchy of nature, the order of the cosmos and reasoned arguments for a prime mover.

Kant imported Plato's high esteem of individual sovereignty into his considerations of moral and noumenal freedom as well as of God. In his discussion of "Spirit" in his Encyclopedia , Hegel praises Aristotle's On the Soul as "by far the most admirable, perhaps even the sole, work of philosophical value on this topic".

Rather than simply rejecting Kant's dualism of freedom versus nature, Hegel aims to subsume it within "true infinity", the "Concept" or " Notion ": Begriff , "Spirit" and "ethical life" in such a way that the Kantian duality is rendered intelligible, rather than remaining a brute "given".

The reason why this subsumption takes place in a series of concepts is that Hegel's method in his Science of Logic and his Encyclopedia is to begin with basic concepts like "Being" and "Nothing" and to develop these through a long sequence of elaborations, including those already mentioned. In this manner, a solution that is reached in principle in the account of "true infinity" in the Science of Logic' s chapter on "Quality" is repeated in new guises at later stages, all the way to "Spirit" and "ethical life" in the third volume of the Encyclopedia.

In this way, Hegel defended the truth in Kantian dualism against reductive or eliminative programs like materialism and empiricism. Like Plato, with his dualism of soul versus bodily appetites, Kant pursued the mind's ability to question its felt inclinations or appetites and to come up with a standard of "duty" or, in Plato's case, "good" which transcends bodily restrictiveness. Hegel preserved this essential Platonic and Kantian concern in the form of infinity going beyond the finite a process that Hegel in fact related to "freedom" and the "ought" , [89] : —, the universal going beyond the particular in the Concept and Spirit going beyond Nature.

Hegel rendered these dualities intelligible by ultimately his argument in the "Quality" chapter of the "Science of Logic". The finite has to become infinite in order to achieve reality. The idea of the absolute excludes multiplicity so the subjective and objective must achieve synthesis to become whole. This is because, as Hegel suggested by his introduction of the concept of "reality", [89] : what determines itself—rather than depending on its relations to other things for its essential character—is more fully "real" following the Latin etymology of "real", more "thing-like" than what does not.

Finite things do not determine themselves because, as "finite" things, their essential character is determined by their boundaries over against other finite things, so in order to become "real" they must go beyond their finitude "finitude is only as a transcending of itself". The result of this argument is that finite and infinite—particular and universal, nature and freedom—do not face one another as independent realities, but instead the latter, in each case, is the self-transcending of the former.

This evolution was the result of God's desire for complete self-awareness. Modern philosophy, culture and society seemed to Hegel fraught with contradictions and tensions, such as those between the subject and object of knowledge, mind and nature, self and Other , freedom and authority, knowledge and faith, or the Enlightenment and Romanticism. Hegel's main philosophical project was to take these contradictions and tensions and interpret them as part of a comprehensive, evolving, rational unity that in different contexts he called "the absolute Idea" Science of Logic , sections — or "absolute knowledge" Phenomenology of Spirit , " DD Absolute Knowledge".

According to Hegel, this unity evolved through and manifested itself in contradiction and negation. Contradiction and negation have the dynamic quality that every point in each domain of reality — consciousness , history, philosophy, art, nature and society—leads to further development until a rational unity is reached that preserves the contradictions as phases and sub-parts by lifting them up Aufhebung to a higher unity.

This mind comprehends all of these phases and sub-parts as steps in its own process of comprehension. It is rational because the same, underlying, logical , developmental order underlies every domain of reality and self-conscious rational thought, although only in the later stages of development does it come to full self-consciousness. The rational, self-conscious whole is not a thing or being that lies outside of other existing things or minds.

Rather, it comes to completion in the philosophical comprehension of individual existing human minds who through their own understanding bring this developmental process to an understanding of itself. Hegel's thought is revolutionary in that it is a philosophy of absolute negation—as long as absolute negation is at the center, systematization remains open, making it possible for human beings to become subjects.

In Hegel's draft manuscripts written during his time at the University of Jena, his notion of "Geist" was tightly bound to the notion of " Aether ", from which he also derived the concepts of space and time , but in his later works after Jena he did not explicitly use his old notion of "Aether". Central to Hegel's conception of knowledge , mind, and reality was identity in difference ; mind externalizes itself in various forms and objects and stands outside or opposed to them and, through recognizing itself in them, is "with itself" in these external manifestations so that they are at one and the same time mind and other-than-mind.

This notion of identity in difference, which is bound up with his conception of contradiction and negativity, is a principal feature differentiating Hegel's thought from other philosophers. Hegel distinguished between civil society and state in his Elements of the Philosophy of Right.

On the left, it became the foundation for Karl Marx 's civil society as an economic base ; [95] to the right, it became a description for all non-state and the state is the peak of the objective spirit aspects of society, including culture, society and politics. This liberal distinction between political society and civil society was used by Alexis de Tocqueville. While it appears that he felt that a civil society, such as the one in which he lived, was an inevitable step in the dialectic, he allowed for the crushing of other "lesser," not fully realized civil societies as they were not fully conscious of their lack of progress.

It was perfectly legitimate in Hegel's eyes for a conqueror, such as Napoleon, to come and destroy that which was not fully realized. Hegel's State is the final culmination of the embodiment of freedom or right Rechte in the Elements of the Philosophy of Right. The State subsumes family and civil society and fulfills them. All three together are called "ethical life" Sittlichkeit. The State involves three " moments ".

In a Hegelian State, citizens both know their place and choose their place. They both know their obligations and choose to fulfill them. An individual's "supreme duty is to be a member of the state" Elements of the Philosophy of Right , section The individual has "substantial freedom in the state".

The State is "objective spirit" so "it is only through being a member of the state that the individual himself has objectivity, truth, and ethical life" section Every member loves the State with genuine patriotism, but has transcended simple "team spirit" by reflectively endorsing their citizenship. According to Hegel, " Heraclitus is the one who first declared the nature of the infinite and first grasped nature as in itself infinite, that is, its essence as process.

The origin of philosophy is to be dated from Heraclitus. His is the persistent Idea that is the same in all philosophers up to the present day, as it was the Idea of Plato and Aristotle". According to Hegel, Heraclitus's "obscurity" comes from his being a true in Hegel's terms "speculative" philosopher who grasped the ultimate philosophical truth and therefore expressed himself in a way that goes beyond the abstract and limited nature of common sense and is difficult to grasp by those who operate within common sense.

Hegel asserted that, in Heraclitus, he had an antecedent for his logic: "[ Hegel cites a number of fragments of Heraclitus in his Lectures on the History of Philosophy. Heraclitus did not form any abstract nouns from his ordinary use of "to be" and "to become" and seemed to oppose any identity A to any other identity B, C and so on, which is not-A.

However, Hegel interprets not-A as not existing at all, not nothing at all, which cannot be conceived, but an indeterminate or "pure" being without particularity or specificity. For Hegel, the inner movement of reality is the process of God thinking as manifested in the evolution of the universe of nature and thought; Hegel argued that, when fully understood, reality is being thought by God as manifested in a person's comprehension of this process.

Since human thought is the image and fulfillment of God's thought, God can be understood by an analysis of thought and reality. Just as humans continually correct their concept of reality through a dialectical process , God becomes more fully manifested through the dialectical process of becoming. For his god, Hegel does not take the logos of Heraclitus but refers to the nous of Anaxagoras , although he may well have regarded them the same as he continues to refer to god's plan, which is identical to God.

Whatever the nous thinks at any time is actual substance and is identical to limited being, but more remains in the substrate of non-being, which is identical to pure or unlimited thought. The universe as becoming is a combination of being and non-being.

The particular is never complete in itself, but in its quest to find completion continually transforms into more comprehensive, complex, self-relating particulars. The essential nature of being-for-itself is that it is free "in itself;" it does not depend on anything else for its being. The limitations represent fetters, which it must constantly cast off as it becomes freer and more self-determining. Although Hegel began his philosophizing with commentary on the Christian religion and often expresses the view that he is a Christian, his ideas are not acceptable to some Christians even though he has had a major influence on 19th- and 20th-century theology.

As a graduate of a Protestant seminary, Hegel's theological concerns were reflected in many of his writings and lectures. His thoughts on the person of Jesus Christ stood out from the theologies of the Enlightenment. In his posthumously published Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion , Part 3 , Hegel is particularly interested in demonstrations of God's existence and the ontological proof.

This means that Jesus, as the Son of God, is posited by God over and against himself as other. Hegel sees relational and metaphysical unities between Jesus and God the Father. To Hegel, Jesus is both divine and human. Hegel further attests that God as Jesus not only died, but "[ God rises again to life, and thus things are reversed". The philosopher Walter Kaufmann argued that there was sharp criticism of traditional Christianity in Hegel's early theological writings. Kaufmann also pointed out that Hegel's references to God or to the divine and spirit drew on classical Greek as well as Christian connotations of the terms.

So he, too, sometimes spoke of God and, more often, of the divine; and because he occasionally took pleasure in insisting that he was really closer to this or that Christian tradition than some of the theologians of his time, he has sometimes been understood to have been a Christian. Hegel identified as an orthodox Lutheran and believed his philosophy was consistent with Christianity. Hegel conceived of the immortality of the soul in the following manner in reference to Christianity: [] [].

Thus the immortality of the soul must not be represented as first entering the sphere of reality only at a later stage; it is the actual present quality of spirit; spirit is eternal, and for this reason is already present. Spirit, as possessed of freedom, does not belong to the sphere of things limited; it, as being what thinks and knows in an absolute way, has the universal for its object; this is eternity, which is not simply duration, as duration can be predicated of mountains, but knowledge.

The eternity of spirit is here brought into consciousness, and is found in this reasoned knowledge, in this very separation, which has reached the infinitude of being-for-self, and which is no longer entangled in what is natural, contingent, and external. This eternity of Spirit in itself means that Spirit is, to begin with, potential; but the next standpoint implies that Spirit ought to be what it is in its essential and complete nature, in-and-for-itself.

Spirit must reflect upon itself, and in this way disunion arises, it must not remain at the point at which it is seen not to be what it is potentially, but must become adequate to its Concept, it must become universal Spirit. Regarded from the standpoint of division or disunion, its potential Being is for it an Other, and it itself is natural will; it is divided within itself, and this division is so far its feeling or consciousness of a contradiction, and there is thus given along with it the necessity for the abolition of the contradiction.

Spirit is immortal; it is eternal; and it is immortal and eternal in virtue of the fact that it is infinite, that it has no such spatial finitude as we associate with the body; when we speak of it being five feet in height, two feet in breadth and thickness, that it is not the Now of time, that the content of its knowledge does not consist of these countless midges, that its volition and freedom have not to do with the infinite mass of existing obstacles, nor of the aims and activities which such resisting obstacles and hindrances have to encounter.

The infinitude of spirit is its inwardness, in an abstract sense its pure inwardness, and this is its thought, and this abstract thought is a real present infinitude, while its concrete inwardness consists in the fact that this thought is Spirit. Hegel seemed to have an ambivalent relationship with magic , myth and Paganism.

He formulated an early philosophical example of a disenchantment narrative, arguing that Judaism was responsible both for realizing the existence of Geist and, by extension, for separating nature from ideas of spiritual and magical forces and challenging polytheism. Hegel continued to develop his thoughts on religion both in terms of how it was to be given a 'wissenschaftlich', or "theoretically rigorous," account in the context of his own "system," and how a fully modern religion could be understood.

In addition to some articles published early in his career and during his Berlin period, Hegel published four major works during his lifetime:. During the last ten years of his life, Hegel did not publish another book but thoroughly revised the Encyclopedia second edition, ; third, A number of other works on the philosophy of history , religion , aesthetics and the history of philosophy [] were compiled from the lecture notes of his students and published posthumously.

Hegel's posthumous works have had remarkable influence on subsequent works on religion, aesthetics, and history because of the comprehensive accounts of the subject matters considered within the lectures, with Heidegger for example in Poetry, Language, Thought characterizing Hegel's Lectures on Aesthetics as the "most comprehensive reflection on the nature of art that the West possesses—comprehensive because it stems from metaphysics.

There are views of Hegel's thought as the summit of early 19th-century German philosophical idealism. It profoundly impacted many future philosophical schools, including those opposed to Hegel's specific dialectical idealism , such as existentialism , the historical materialism of Marx, historism and British Idealism. Hegel's influence was immense in philosophy and other sciences.

In the United States, Hegel's influence is evident in pragmatism. The more recent movement of communitarianism has a strong Hegelian influence. Some of Hegel's writing was intended for those with advanced knowledge of philosophy, although his Encyclopedia was intended as a textbook in a university course. Nevertheless, Hegel assumed that his readers are well-versed in Western philosophy.

Those without this background would be advised to begin with one of the many general introductions to his thought. As is always the case, difficulties are magnified for those reading him in translation. In fact, Hegel himself argued, in his Science of Logic , that German was particularly conducive to philosophical thought.

According to Walter Kaufmann, the basic idea of Hegel's works, especially the Phenomenology of Spirit , is that a philosopher should not "confine him or herself to views that have been held but penetrate these to the human reality they reflect". In other words, it is not enough to consider propositions, or even the content of consciousness; "it is worthwhile to ask in every instance what kind of spirit would entertain such propositions, hold such views, and have such a consciousness.

Every outlook in other words, is to be studied not merely as an academic possibility but as an existential reality". Some historians have spoken of Hegel's influence as represented by two opposing camps. Today this faction continues among conservative Protestants, such as the Wisconsin Evangelical Lutheran Synod , which was founded by missionaries from Germany when the Hegelian Right was active.

The Left Hegelians , also known as the Young Hegelians, interpreted Hegel in a revolutionary sense, leading to an advocation of atheism in religion and liberal democracy in politics. Recent studies have questioned this paradigm. Critiques of Hegel offered by the Left Hegelians radically diverted Hegel's thinking into new directions and eventually came to form a large part of the literature on and about Hegel.

The Left Hegelians also influenced Marxism, which has in turn inspired global movements, from the Russian Revolution , the Chinese Revolution and myriad of practices up until the present moment. Twentieth-century interpretations of Hegel were mostly shaped by British idealism , logical positivism , Marxism and Fascism.

According to Benedetto Croce , the Italian Fascist Giovanni Gentile "holds the honor of having been the most rigorous neo-Hegelian in the entire history of Western philosophy and the dishonor of having been the official philosopher of Fascism in Italy".

In accounts of Hegelianism formed prior to the Hegel renaissance, Hegel's dialectic was often characterized as a three-step process, " thesis, antithesis, synthesis "; a "thesis" e. However, Hegel used this classification only once and he attributed the terminology to Kant. The terminology was largely developed earlier by Fichte. The "thesis—antithesis—synthesis" approach erroneously gives the sense that things or ideas are contradicted or opposed by things that come from outside them.

To the contrary, the fundamental notion of Hegel's dialectic is that things or ideas have internal contradictions. For Hegel, analysis or comprehension of a thing or idea reveals that underneath its apparently simple identity or unity is an underlying inner contradiction. This contradiction leads to the dissolution of the thing or idea in the simple form in which it presented to a higher-level, more complex thing or idea that more adequately incorporates the contradiction.

The triadic form that appears in many places in Hegel e. For Hegel, reason is "speculative" — not "dialectical". According to their argument, although Hegel referred to "the two elemental considerations: first, the idea of freedom as the absolute and final aim; secondly, the means for realising it, i.

Furthermore, in Hegel's language the "dialectical" aspect or "moment" of thought and reality, by which things or thoughts turn into their opposites or have their inner contradictions brought to the surface, what he called Aufhebung , is only preliminary to the "speculative" and not "synthesizing" aspect or "moment", which grasps the unity of these opposites or contradiction. It is now widely agreed that explaining Hegel's philosophy in terms of thesis—antithesis—synthesis is inaccurate.

Nevertheless, this interpretation survives in a number of scholarly works. In the last half of the 20th century, Hegel's philosophy underwent a major renaissance. This was due to a the rediscovery and re-evaluation of Hegel as a possible philosophical progenitor of Marxism by philosophically oriented Marxists; b a resurgence of Hegel's historical perspective; and c an increasing recognition of the importance of his dialectical method.

In Reason and Revolution , Herbert Marcuse made the case for Hegel as a revolutionary and criticized Leonard Trelawny Hobhouse 's thesis that Hegel was a totalitarian. Beginning in the s, Anglo-American Hegel scholarship has challenged the traditional interpretation of Hegel as offering a metaphysical system: this has also been the approach of Z.

Pelczynski and Shlomo Avineri. This view, sometimes referred to as the "non-metaphysical option", has influenced many major English-language studies of Hegel. Late 20th-century literature in Western Theology that is friendly to Hegel includes works by such writers as Walter Kaufmann , Dale M. Schlitt , Theodore Geraets , Philip M. Two prominent American philosophers, John McDowell and Robert Brandom sometimes referred to as the " Pittsburgh Hegelians" , have produced philosophical works with a marked Hegelian influence.

In a separate Canadian context, James Doull 's philosophy is deeply Hegelian. Beginning in the s after the fall of the Soviet Union, a fresh reading of Hegel took place in the West. Marx plays little-to-no role in these new readings. Criticism of Hegel has been widespread in the 19th and the 20th centuries. Ayer have challenged Hegelian philosophy from a variety of perspectives.

Among the first to take a critical view of Hegel's system was the 19th-century German group known as the Young Hegelians , which included Feuerbach, Marx, Engels and their followers. In particular, Russell considered "almost all" of Hegel's doctrines to be false.

Hegel's contemporary Schopenhauer was particularly critical and wrote of Hegel's philosophy as "a pseudo-philosophy paralyzing all mental powers, stifling all real thinking". A guardian fearing that his ward might become too intelligent for his schemes might prevent this misfortune by innocently suggesting the reading of Hegel. Karl Popper wrote that "there is so much philosophical writing especially in the Hegelian school which may justly be criticised as meaningless verbiage". Popper further proposed that Hegel's philosophy served not only as an inspiration for communist and fascist totalitarian governments of the 20th century, whose dialectics allow for any belief to be construed as rational simply if it could be said to exist.

Kaufmann and Shlomo Avineri have criticized Popper's theories about Hegel. Voegelin argued that Hegel should be understood not as a philosopher, but as a "sorcerer", i. From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. German philosopher — For other uses, see Hegel disambiguation. Portrait by Jakob Schlesinger , Berlin , Kingdom of Prussia. Continental philosophy German idealism Objective idealism Absolute idealism Hegelianism Historicism [2] Naturphilosophie Epistemic coherentism [3] Conceptualism [4] Empirical realism [5] Coherence theory of truth [6].

Main article: Science of Logic. See also: Porphyrian tree. See also: Civil society. See also: Hegelianism. This section needs additional citations for verification. Please help improve this article by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. Main article: Thesis, antithesis, synthesis.

Main article: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel bibliography. Philosophy portal. Daniel Breazeale. In Breazeale, Daniel; Fichte, Johann Fichte: Early Philosophical Writings. Cornell University Press. The Coherence Theory of Truth. Stanford University. II, Meiner, [], pp. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 5 February Journal of the History of Economic Thought. Subjects of desire: Hegelian reflections in twentieth-century France.

New York: Columbia University Press. Random House Webster's Unabridged Dictionary. Longman Pronunciation Dictionary 3rd ed. ISBN Duden in German. Retrieved 18 October Phenomenological Reviews. Retrieved 3 September It does not occur anywhere in The Science of Logic though he comes close in a remark on p. Greraets, Suchting and Harris note in the introduction to their translation of this later text that the term is more strongly associated with English movement in that later part of the 19th century Hackett: , xiii.

Translated by Breazeale, Daniel. Retrieved 17 April Systematic Theology, Volume 1. University of Chicago Press. Jahrhundert , Harper, Herbert L. Hegel, Hegel and the Greeks. Subjects of desire : Hegelian reflections in twentieth-century France. Columbia University Press. OCLC Hegel: A Biography. Cambridge University Press.

The Cambridge Companion to Hegel. Phenomenology and System. Lexington Books. Archived from the original PDF on 8 October Retrieved 9 August Hegel, Dissertatio philosophica de Orbitis Planetarum. Hegel, Philosophical Dissertation on the Orbits of the Planets. Journal for the History of Astronomy. Bibcode : JHA S2CID The letter was not published in Hegel's time, but the expression was attributed to Hegel anecdotally, appearing in print from L.

Noack, Schelling und die Philosophie der Romantik , , p. The phrase become widely associated with Hegel later in the 19th century, e. October , p. Hegel, letter of 13 October to F. Niethammer, no. Hoffmeister, vol. Pinkard A Companion to Heidegger. Wrathall, Mark A. Critique of Pure Reason. Hegel's Science of Logic. Miller, Arnold V. Amherst, N. Hegel's science of logic. Science of Logic. Humanity Books. Arnold V. Humanities Press. Hegel's dialectic : five hermeneutical studies.

Smith, P. New Haven: Yale University Press. Retrieved 23 April Hegel's logic : between dialectic and history. Evanston, Ill. Understanding Hegel's Mature Critique of Kant. Stanford, California. Hegel's concept of life : self-consciousness, freedom, logic.

New York, NY. The science of logic. Di Giovanni, George, —. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Retrieved 17 December Retrieved 1 July An Introduction to Hegel's Logic. Lars Aagaard-Mogensen trans. Hackett Publishing. A History of Philosophy: Volume 7: 18th and 19th century German philosophy.

Continuum International Publishing Group. Chapter X. Krug", Kritisches Journal der Philosophie , I, no. Copenhagen : Museum Tusculanum Press — p. In the s the German philosopher Klaus Hartmann developed what was termed a non-metaphysical interpretation of Hegel which, together with the work of Dieter Henrich and others, played an important role in the revival of interest in Hegel in academic philosophy in the second half of the century.

By the close of the twentieth century, even within core logico-metaphysical areas of analytic philosophy, a number of individuals such as Robert Brandom and John McDowell had started to take Hegel seriously as a significant modern philosopher, although generally within analytic circles a favorable reassessment of Hegel has still a long way to go.

The contents of philosophical knowledge, we might suspect, will come from the historically changing contents of its cultural context. On the other, there is the hint of such contents being raised to some higher level, presumably higher than other levels of cognitive functioning such as those based in everyday perceptual experience, for example, or those characteristic of other areas of culture such as art and religion.

This higher level takes the form of conceptually articulated thought , a type of cognition commonly taken as capable of having purportedly eternal contents think of Plato and Frege, for example, who both have the truths of mathematics in mind. In line with such a conception, Hegel sometimes referred to the task of philosophy as that of recognising the concept Der Begriff in the mere representations Vorstellungen of everyday life.

In contrast, the British Hegelian movement at the end of the nineteenth century tended to ignore the Phenomenology and the more historicist dimensions of his thought, and found in Hegel a systematic metaphysician whose Logic provided the basis for a definitive philosophical ontology. This latter traditional metaphysical view of Hegel dominated Hegel reception for most of the twentieth century, but from the s came to be challenged by scholars who offered an alternative non-metaphysical, post-Kantian view.

But in turn, this post-Kantian reading has been challenged by a revised metaphysical view, critical of the purported over -assimilation of Hegel to Kant by the post-Kantians. Thus, for example, Leibniz had contrasted Plato as an idealist with Epicurus as a materialist.

The opposition to materialism here, together with the fact that in the English-speaking world the Irish philosopher and clergyman George Berkeley — is often taken as a prototypical idealist, has given rise to the assumption that idealism is necessarily an immaterialist doctrine.

This assumption, however, is mistaken. The type of picture found in Berkeley was only to be found in certain late antique Platonists and, especially, early Christian Platonists like Saint Augustine, Bishop of Hippo. It thus had features closer to the more pantheistic picture of divine thought found in Spinoza, for example, for whom matter and mind were attributes of the one substance.

The materialists to which he was opposed mechanistic corpuscularists of his time conceived of unformed matter as a type of self-subsistent substance, and it seems to have been that conception to which he was opposed, at least in some periods of his work, not the reality of matter per se.

Given the understanding of Hegel that predominated at the time of the birth of analytic philosophy, together with the fact that early analytic philosophers were rebelling precisely against Hegelianism so understood, the interpretation of Hegel encountered in discussions within analytic philosophy is often that of the late nineteenth-century interpretation.

In this picture, Hegel is seen as offering a metaphysico-religious view of God qua Absolute Spirit, as the ultimate reality that we can come to know through pure thought processes alone. Indeed, Hegel often seems to invoke imagery consistent with the types of neo-Platonic conceptions of the universe that had been common within Christian mysticism, especially in the German states, in the early modern period. Thus, in our consciousness of God, we somehow serve to realize his own self-consciousness, and, thereby, his own perfection.

In English-language interpretations, such a picture is effectively found in the work of Charles Taylor and Michael Rosen , for example. With its dark mystical roots, and its overtly religious content, it is hardly surprising that the philosophy of Hegel so understood has rarely been regarded as a live option within the largely secular and scientific conceptions of philosophy that have been dominant in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.

To critics, such as Karl Popper in his popular post-war The Open Society and its Enemies , Hegel had not only advocated a disastrous political conception of the state and the relation of its citizens to it, a conception prefiguring twentieth-century totalitarianism, but he had also tried to underpin such advocacy with dubious theo-logico-metaphysical speculations.

With his idea of the development of spirit in history, Hegel is seen as literalising a way of talking about different cultures in terms of their spirits, of constructing a developmental sequence of epochs typical of nineteenth-century ideas of linear historical progress, and then enveloping this story of human progress in terms of one about the developing self-conscious of the cosmos-God itself. The pantheistic legacy inherited by Hegel meant that he had no problem in considering an objective outer world beyond any particular subjective mind.

But this objective world itself had to be understood as conceptually informed: it was objectified spirit. Thus in contrast to Berkeleian subjective idealism it became common to talk of Hegel as incorporating the objective idealism of views, especially common among German historians, in which social life and thought were understood in terms of the conceptual or spiritual structures that informed them.

But in contrast to both forms of idealism, Hegel, according to this reading, postulated a form of absolute idealism by including both subjective life and the objective cultural practices on which subjective life depended within the dynamics of the development of the self-consciousness and self-actualisation of God, the Absolute Spirit.

Despite this seemingly dominant theological theme, Hegel was still seen by many as an important precursor of other more characteristically secular strands of modern thought such as existentialism and Marxist materialism.

Existentialists were thought of as taking the idea of the finitude and historical and cultural dependence of individual subjects from Hegel, and as leaving out all pretensions to the Absolute, while Marxists were thought of as taking the historical dynamics of the Hegelian picture but reinterpreting this in materialist rather than idealist categories.

As for understanding Hegel himself, the traditional metaphysical view remained the dominant interpretative approach of Hegel scholars throughout much of the twentieth century. Thus it is commonly asserted that implicit within the metaphysical Hegel is an anti-metaphysical philosopher struggling to get out—one potentially capable of beating the critical Kant at his own game.

More controversially, one now finds it argued that the traditional picture is simply wrong at a more general level, and that Hegel, even in his systematic thought, was not committed to the bizarre, teleological spirit monism that has been traditionally attributed to him because he was free of the type of traditional metaphysical commitments that had been criticized by Kant.

Prominent among such interpretations has been the so-called post-Kantian interpretation advanced by North American Hegel scholars Robert Pippin , , and Terry Pinkard , , From an explicitly analytic perspective, broadly similar views have been put forward by Robert Brandom , , and John McDowell , With this notion, it is claimed, Hegel was essentially attempting to answer the Kantian question of the conditions of rational human mindedness, rather than being concerned with giving an account of the developing self-consciousness of God.

But while Kant had limited such conditions to formal abstractly conceived structures of the mind, Hegel extended them to include aspects of historically and socially determined forms of embodied human existence. Proponents of the post-Kantian view, it is commonly said, are guilty of projecting onto Hegel views they would like to find there rather than what is actually to be found. Here one tends to find interpreters attributing to Hegel some type of conceptual realism, sometimes appealing to contemporary analytic metaphysics for the legitimacy of metaphysics conceived as inquiry into the fundamental features or structures of the world itself.

Among the interpreters advancing something like this revised metaphysical view might be counted Stephen Houlgate b , Robert Stern , , Kenneth Westphal , James Kreines , and Christopher Yeomans On a number of points, the proponents of the revised conceptual realist metaphysical interpretation will agree with advocates of the post-Kantian non-metaphysical approach.

First, they tend to agree in dismissing much of the extravagant metaphysics traditionally ascribed to Hegel. While it is for the most part clear what sets both post-Kantians and conceptual realists against the traditional view, it is still not clear which issues dividing them are substantive and which are ultimately verbal. Brandom, for example, while often classed with the post-Kantians, also construes Hegel as a conceptual realist Brandom , while Redding, appealing to the earlier work of J.

Findlay, attempts to combine the post-Kantian approach with what he calls an actualist rather than a realist interpretation of Hegel Redding In recent work, both Pippin and Pinkard , the major representatives of the post-Kantian position, have insisted that their own interpretations are compatible with many of the Aristotelian features of Hegel to which conceptual realists allude.

In relation to such debates it must be remembered that Kant himself was not critical of metaphysics per se. His claim was that existing so-called dogmatic metaphysics was in a state analogous to that in which, say, physics had been in before the scientific revolution of sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Rather than wanting to eliminate metaphysics, after the style, say, of Hume or the modern logical positivists, Kant had wanted to put metaphysics itself on a secure scientific basis analogous to what Galileo and Newton had achieved for physics.

In the next category are works that were published at the time as handbooks for use in student teaching such as the Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences first published in while he was teaching at Heidelberg and subsequently revised and republished in and again in , and Elements of the Philosophy of Right , effectively an expansion of a section of the Encyclopaedia and published in after his move to Berlin.

Transcripts of his earlier lectures on this topic delivered in Heidelberg have also since been published. Along with the Encyclopaedia and the Philosophy of Right might be added similar teaching-related writings from the Jena period, prepared as lectures but only published as such much later. Here we will restrict the discussion to the first three categories.

The term clearly suited Kant as he had distinguished the phenomena known through the faculty of sensibility from the noumena known purely conceptually. It is meant to function as an induction or education of the reader to the standpoint of purely conceptual thought from which philosophy can be done.

As such, its structure has been compared to that of a Bildungsroman educational novel , having an abstractly conceived protagonist—the bearer of an evolving series of so-called shapes of consciousness or the inhabitant of a series of successive phenomenal worlds—whose progress and set-backs the reader follows and learns from.

Or at least this is how the work sets out: in the later sections the earlier series of shapes of consciousness becomes replaced with what seem more like configurations of human social life , and the work comes to look more like an account of interlinked forms of social existence and thought within which participants in such forms of social life conceive of themselves and the world. Hegel constructs a series of such shapes that maps onto the history of western European civilization from the Greeks to his own time.

When Kant had broached the idea of a phenomenological propaedeutic to Lambert, he himself had still believed in the project of a purely conceptual metaphysics achievable by the use of the regressive or analytic method, but this project conceived as an exercise in theoretical reason was just what Kant in his later critical philosophy had come to disavow. Supporters of the post-Kantian interpretation of Hegel obviously interpret this work and its telos differently. For example, it has been argued e.

As Pinkard had pointed out in that work, this was a conception of the normatively structured practices of human reason found in the American pragmatist Wilfrid Sellars, the inspiration behind the Hegelian dimensions of analytic philosophers such as Willem deVries , Robert Brandom and John McDowell.

Chapters 1 to 3 effectively follow a developmental series of distinct shapes of consciousness—jointly epistemological and ontological attitudes articulated by criteria which are, regarded from one direction, criteria for certain knowledge , and from the other, criteria for the nature of the objects of such knowledge.

In chapter 1, the attitude of Sense-certainty takes immediately given perceptual simples—the sort of role played by the so-called sense-data of early twentieth-century analytic epistemology, for example, with which a subject is purportedly acquainted as bare thises —as the fundamental objects known. The idea seems to be that for Hegel, the same content can play the roles played by both concepts and intuitions in Kant.

By the end of this chapter our protagonist consciousness and by implication, we the audience to this drama has learnt that the nature of consciousness cannot be as originally thought: rather than being immediate and singular, its contents must have some implicit universal conceptual aspect to them. The general truth that was learned about the apparent qualitative simples in Sense-certainty that they were instances of generals is now explicitly taken as the truth of the object of Perception Wahrnehmung —in German this term having the connotations of taking nehmen to be true wahr.

But this can be conceived in a variety of ways: first, as a simple bundle of indifferent qualities a picture associated with Plato , or as an underlying substrate in which these qualities somehow inhere a picture associated with Aristotle. Predictably, problems will be revealed in these various different ways of thinking of the nature of those everyday objects of our experience.

In fact, such collapse into a type of self-generated skepticism is typical of all the shapes we follow in the work, and there seems something inherently skeptical about such reflexive cognitive processes. But this is not the type of skepticism that is typical of early modern philosophy, such as that used by Descartes in his attempt to find some foundation of indubitability on which genuine knowledge can be built Forster As is clear from his treatment of ancient philosophy in the Lectures on the History of Philosophy , Hegel was attracted to the type of dialectic employed by Socrates in his efforts to get his interlocutors thinking about something beyond that given immediately in sensation LHP II: 51 , and implicit in the ancient form of skepticism that had been employed after Socrates LHP II: For Hegel, the ancient skeptics captured the skeptical moment of thought that is the means by which thought progresses beyond the particular categories that have given rise to contradictions.

Just as in the way a new shape of thought, Perception, had been generated from the internal contradictions that emerged within Sense-certainty, the collapse of any given attitude will be accompanied by the emergence of some new implicit criterion that will be the basis of a new emergent attitude. In the case of Perception, the emergent new shape of consciousness, the Understanding, explored in Chapter 3, is a shape identified with the type of scientific cognition that, rather than remaining on the level of the perceived object, posits underlying forces involved in the production of the perceptual episode.

The transition from Chapter 3 to Chapter 4, The Truth of Self-Certainty, also marks a more general transition from Consciousness to Self -consciousness. It is in the course of Chapter 4 that we find what is perhaps the most well-known part of the Phenomenology , the account of the struggle of recognition in which Hegel examines the inter-subjective conditions which he sees as necessary for any form of consciousness. Such complex patterns of mutual recognition constituting objective spirit thereby provide the social matrix within which individual self-consciousnesses can exist as such.

But this is only worked out in the text gradually. So we have to see how the protagonist self-consciousness could achieve this insight. It is to this end that we further trace the learning path of self-consciousness through the processes of reason in Chapter 5 before objective spirit can become the explicit subject matter of Chapter 6 Spirit.

Thus Hegel might be seen as adopting the viewpoint that since social life is ordered by customs we can approach the lives of those living in it in terms of the patterns of those customs or conventions themselves—the conventional practices, as it were, constituting specific, shareable forms of life made actual in the lives of particular individuals who had in turn internalized such general patterns in the process of acculturation.

It is not surprising then that his account of spirit here starts with a discussion of religious and civic law. But for non-traditionalists it is not obvious that Hegel, in employing such phrases, is in any way committed to any metaphysical supra-individual conscious being or beings. The idea seems to be that humans in society not only interact, but that they collectively create relatively enduring cultural products repeatable stories, stageable dramas, and so forth within which members of that society can recognise patterns of their own communal life as so reflected.

Furthermore, such cultural products themselves provide conditions allowing individuals to adopt particular cognitive attitudes by appropriating their resources. For Kant, the practical knowledge of morality, orienting one within the noumenal world, exceeds the scope of theoretical knowledge, which had been limited to phenomena. Hegel, however, thought that philosophy had to unify theoretical and practical knowledge, and so the Phenomenology has further to go.

Again, this is seen differently by traditionalists and revisionists. Revisionists, on the other hand, tend to see Hegel as furthering the Kantian critique into the very coherence of a conception of an in-itself reality that is beyond the limits of our theoretical but not practical cognition.

However we understand this, absolute knowing is the standpoint to which Hegel has hoped to bring the reader in this complex work. For most of the 20 th century it was not received with the enthusiasm that often marked the reception of Phenomenology of Spirit. First, as a work of logic most have regarded it as radically outdated and relying on an Aristotelian approach that was definitively surpassed in the later nineteenth century—a view promoted especially by Bertrand Russell in the early years of the twentieth.

Recently, this skepticism has started to change. Some advocate that the Science of Logic be read as a first-order ontological doctrine Doz or as a category theory that simultaneously represents structures of being and thought Houlgate b , and so as having very little to do with what has traditionally been known as logic. In short, taking the logic as a category theory opens up two general lines of interpretation: should the categories be understood as primarily ontological categories, as found in Aristotle, or as primarily categories revealing the necessary structure of thought , as in Kant?

Those, such as the advocates of the revised metaphysical interpretation, interpreting Hegel as basically a metaphysician, typically stress the former, while post-Kantian interpreters typically stress the latter. A glance at the table of contents of Science of Logic reveals the same triadic structuring among the categories or thought determinations discussed that has been noted among the shapes of consciousness in the Phenomenology.

At the highest level of its branching structure there are the three books devoted to the doctrines of being, essence, and concept, while in turn, each book has three sections, each section containing three chapters, and so on. In general, each of these individual nodes deals with some particular category.

Reading into the first chapter of Book 1, Being, it is quickly seen that the transitions of the Logic broadly repeat those of the first chapters of the Phenomenology , now, however, as between the categories themselves rather than between conceptions of the respective objects of conscious experience.

Thus, being is the thought determination with which the work commences because it at first seems to be the most immediate, fundamental determination that characterises any possible thought content at all. Whatever thought is about, that topic must in some sense exist. Like those purported simple sensory givens with which the Phenomenology starts, the category being looks to have no internal structure or constituents, but again in a parallel to the Phenomenology , it is the effort of thought to make this category explicit that both undermines it and brings about new ones.

Being seems to be both immediate and simple, but it will show itself to be, in fact, only something in opposition to something else, nothing. The only way out of this paradox is to posit a third category within which they can coexist as negated Aufgehoben moments. This category is becoming , which saves thinking from paralysis because it accommodates both concepts.

Becoming contains being and nothing in the sense that when something becomes it passes, as it were, from nothingness to being. But these contents cannot be understood apart from their contributions to the overarching category: this is what it is to be negated aufgehoben within the new category. In general this is how the Logic proceeds: seeking its most basic and universal determination, thought posits a category to be reflected upon, finds then that this collapses due to a contradiction generated, like that generated by the category being, and so then seeks a further category with which to make retrospective senses of those contradictory categories.

However, in turn the new category will generate some further contradictory negation and again the demand will arise for a further concept that can reconcile these opposed concepts by incorporating them as moments. It is in terms of this category that we can think, along with Aristotle, of a thing having an underlying substrate within which properties inhere and which, unlike the properties themselves, cannot be thought in general terms, but only in terms of the category of singularity.

And yet this will encounter a problem for the determinacy of this underlying substrate— it will have to find determining contrasts that allow it to be determinately conceived. In Book 2 of the Logic we will learn that the category of singularity will rely on particularity just as particularity has been shown to rely on singularlity. Attempting to unravel the intricacies of the patterns of dependence between such categories will be task of this mammoth work, but here a general point might be made.

Hegel only explicitly explores the details of the interactions of these determinations of conceptuality in his discussion of judgments and syllogisms in Book 3, The Doctrine of Concept, suggesting that concerns of logic as traditionally conceived are not as irrelevant to the Science of Logic as often thought. However, the general point separating his approach from that of Spinoza clearly emerges earlier on. The other basic methodological principle of the Logic will be that this categorical infrastructure of thought is able to be unpacked using only the resources available to thought itself: the capacity of thought to make its contents determinate in a way somewhat like what Leibniz had thought of as making clear but confused ideas clear and distinct , and its capacity to be consistent and avoid contradiction.

For Kant, transcendental logic was the logic governing the thought of finite thinkers like ourselves, whose cognition was constrained by the necessity of applying general discursive concepts to the singular contents given in sensory intuitions, and he contrasted this with the thought of a type of thinker not so constrained—God—a thinker whose thought could directly grasp the world in a type of intellectual intuition. It is also a science of actual content as well, and as such has an ontological dimension.

Naturally the logical structures and processes implicit in essence-thinking are more developed than those of being-thinking. In contrast, the categories of Being-logic seem to govern thought processes that are restricted to qualitative phenomena and their co-ordinations. But distinction between essence and appearance must itself instantiate the relation of determinate negation, and the metaphysical tendency to think of reality as made up of some underlying substrates in contrast to the superficial appearances will itself come to grief with the discovery that the notion of an essence is only meaningful in virtue of the appearance that it is meant to explain away.

In terms of the ultimate conceptual categories of singularity, particularity and universality, this discovery would be equivalent to grasping the idea that the singularity of the underlying, non-perceivable substrate or substantial form is meaningful only in relation to something that can bear the particular qualities that constitutes its worldly appearance.

For Hegel it is the complex modern, but pre-Kantian, versions of substance metaphysics, like those of Spinoza and Leibniz, that bring out in the most developed way the inherently contradictory nature of this form of thought. Book 3, The Doctrine of Concept, effects a shift from the Objective Logic of Books 1 and 2, to Subjective Logic, and metaphysically coincides with a shift to the modern subject-based category theory of Kant. Just as Kantian philosophy is founded on a conception of objectivity secured by conceptual coherence, Concept-logic commences with the concept of concept itself, with its moments of singularity, particularity and universality.

While in the two books of objective logic, the movement had been between particular concepts, being, nothing, becoming etc. S and P are thus meant 1 to be diverse, but 2 to form a unity—a situation we are now familiar with in terms of the Aufhebung of parts in a whole. Hegel takes this as signaling two ways of thinking of the relation of subject and predicate in the judgment. One can take subject and predicate terms as self-subsistent entities that are joined in the judgment, or one can take the judgment itself as the primary unit that splits into subject and predicate terms.

This in fact coincides with the two different ways in which logical relations have been conceived in the history of philosophy: the former represents the term-logical approach characteristic of Aristotle, while the latter represents the propositional approach characteristic of the Stoics and much recent philosophy. From the former point of view one thinks of the subject term as designating a substance, typically grasped as an instance of a kind, in which properties, designated by predicate terms, inhere.

From the latter point of view, one thinks of predicate terms as abstract universals that subsume or are satisfied by entities to which the subject terms refer, an approach which conceives of the propositional content, in Stoic terminology—the lecton , the what-is-said —as having a primacy over the parts. Using a distinction from the Medievals, we can describe the first type of judgments as de re about things and the second as de dicto about sayings. These alternative joining and splitting approaches can in turn be applied to the relationship of judgments within inferences or syllogisms.

In contrast with Kant, Hegel seems to go beyond a transcendental deduction of the formal conditions of experience and thought and to a deduction of their material conditions. Such a psychologistic attitude was opposed by Hegel just as it was opposed by a figure as central to modern logic as Gottlob Frege. For Frege, thoughts are not mental, rather they are abstract entities like numbers, so the problem facing us is not how to go from mental contents to the concrete world, it is how to go from abstract to concrete ones.

In fact Bertrand Russell had, at points in his career, entertained such an idea of propositional content itself. Thus when Hegel characterizes some judgment structures typically perception based judgments as judgments of existence one might take the perceived thing itself as straightforwardly part of the content of the judgment.

It is a concrete object, but not grasped as a concrete simple , but grasped in relation to what is judged of it in the predicate. And to the extent that judgments can be considered components of syllogisms, we might appreciate how syllogisms might have become contentful in a process that has culminated in the concrete syllogism of necessity. In the Phenomenology it turned out that the capacity for a subject to entertain objects of consciousness such as perceptual ones was that such a subject was capable of self-consciousness.

It then turned out that to be capable of self-consciousness the subject had to exist in a world with other embodied subjects whose intentions it could recognize. Formally considered we might think of this syllogism as the logical schematization of the most developed form of recognition in which thinkers acknowledge others as free thinkers. What we see here is a reprise of the conception of logos as an objective process running through the world as had been conceived by the ancient Stoics and neo-Platonists.

But it is now embedded not simply in the world as such—in nature —but in objectivized spirit , in human communities of thinkers. We are now returned to the domain of objectivity that had characterized Books 1 and 2 of the Science of Logic , but we might expect such a return from subjectivity to have effected a change in objectivity as earlier understood. To cross straight into a consideration of the objectivity of the human world of action and thought—spirit—would be to break the developmental pattern of the logic because thought about such a complex form of objective existence will presuppose thought about simpler forms.

And so the starting point for the consideration of objectivity will again be that of the simple object as something immediately grasped by thought. But this object can now be developed with that elaborate conceptual apparatus that has emerged in the preceding section. This adequate concept is the Idea , which, after tracking through considerations of the living individual and theoretical and practical cognition, emerges as the Absolute Idea.

The first part of the Encyclopaedia is essentially a condensed version of his earlier Science of Logic , considered above. Was not Hegel simply trying to pre-empt the work of empirical scientists by somehow attempting to anticipate the very contents of their discoveries from logical considerations alone? Krug is mentioned explicitly in a footnote at this point.

In these sciences the empirical element is the sole confirmation of the hypothesis, so that everything has to be explained. In keeping with the more general idea that that philosophy attempts to discern or recognize concepts in representations Vorstellungen or empirical appearances, philosophy of nature investigates the conceptual structures that are manifest in the products of the scientific work that is done on the basis of those appearances.

Traces of conceptual determination will certainly survive in the most particularized product, although they will not exhaust its nature. Clearly, philosophy of nature is not in competition with the empirical natural sciences; it takes as its subject matter the results of those sciences in order to discover within them the particular ways in which the necessary categorial structures deduced in the logic are expressed.

In terms of topics treated, the Philosophy of Nature largely coincides with those treated in the third book of the Science of Logic when the logical processes and relations in question have returned to objectivity after the excursion into the subjectivity of formal logic at the outset of Book 3. In Mechanism Hegel had reconstructed a movement in thought from a primitive cosmology in which all objects are conceived in relation to a central object the sun that exemplifies objecthood per se , to a system of objects within which any such self-sufficient center has been eliminated.

In this Newtonian world, that which gives order to the whole now has the ideality of law, but this is itself thought of as external to the system of objects. In the Newtonian laws of mechanics, however, the unity of matter is still only formal , and in Section Two, Physics, the determinateness of form is now considered as immanent within such corporeal matter.

Matter has individuality to the extent that it is determined within itself by having being-for-self developed within it. It is through this determination that matter breaks away from gravity and manifests itself as implicitly self-determining. While Mechanics clearly reflects the more space-filling conception of matter dominant in British thought, Physics is consistent with the more dynamic continental European conception of matter originating in Leibniz with his idea of living forces.

Within this framework, Hegel attempts to organize a vast array of areas of contemporary physical investigation including meteorology, theories of sound and heat, light and electricity up to and including chemical processes which stand on the threshold of Organic Physics, dealt with in Section Three. From such a conception, the first body to be considered is that of the earth itself , along with its history. Chapter Two moves to a consideration of the plant and Chapter Three, the animal organism.

From the point of view of the actual content of scientific theories and approaches that Hegel summarizes and locates within his system, his Philosophy of Nature is clearly a product of his time. Nevertheless, many of the underlying philosophical issues dealt with are still now far from settled. Within subjective spirit, we may anticipate that the first division, Anthropology, will follow on from topics with which Philosophy of Nature ends—the animal organism—and so it does.

If soul and body are absolutely opposed to one another as is maintained by the abstractive intellectual consciousness,. The community was, however, recognized by ancient metaphysics as an undeniable fact. The Seele of Anthropology should therefore not be confused with the modern subjective conception of mind, as exemplified by Descartes and other early modern philosophers. Aristotle had conceived of the soul as the form of the body, not as a substance separate from that of the body, and had attributed lesser souls to animals and even plants.

Concomitantly, in this section Hegel describes spirit as sunk in nature, and treats consciousness as largely limited to what now might be described as sentient or phenomenal consciousness alone—the feeling soul. Consciousness in the sense of the modern subject—object opposition only makes its appearance in the following second section, Phenomenology of Spirit, which, reprising key moments from the earlier book of that name, raises a problem for how we are to understand the relation of phenomenology and systematic philosophy: is it a path to it or part of it?

Given that the recognitive approach to self-consciousness presupposes that potential self-consciousnesses are in fact embodied and located in the world, we would expect the mind as treated in Psychology to be no less embodied as the way in which it is conceived in Anthropology. What in fact distinguishes the mind of Psychology from that of Anthropology is its rational capacities, considered in terms that would now be described as normative rather than simply naturalistic, and this for Hegel clearly signals a difference in the way in which an actual psychological subject relates to his or her own body.

The type of abstractive thinking found in Psychology does not, of course, as in mythical images of metempsychosis—a favorite trope of Platonists—involve the mind leaving the body. This would count for Hegel as a piece of mythical picture thinking—a Vorstellung.

Rather, it involves a certain capacity of the psychological subject to suspend unreflected-upon endorsement of the claims made on behalf of his or her body, for example, to subject the evidence given by the senses to rational scrutiny.

In this sense, we are witnessing within another mode, the type of progression seen in the movement in Phenomenology from shapes of consciousness to shapes of spirit. The internal Phenomenology of Spirit seems to play an important role in setting up this transition from Psychology to Objective Spirit Williams , but it might also be seen as crucial in relating the more cognitive dimensions of Psychology back to the theme of embodiment prominent in Anthropology Nuzzo a.

Thus any naturalistic analysis is ultimately surpassed by a social and historical one, which itself cannot be understood as anti -naturalistic. The philosophy of subjective spirit passes over into that of objective spirit , which concerns the objective patterns of social interaction and the cultural institutions within which spirit is objectified.

The Philosophy of Right as it is more commonly called can be read as a political philosophy that stands independently of the system Tunick , despite the fact that Hegel intended it to be read against the background of the developing conceptual determinations of the Logic. The text proper starts from the conception of a singular willing subject grasped from the point of view of its individual self-consciousness as the bearer of abstract right. While this conception of the individual willing subject possessing some kind of fundamental rights was in fact the starting point of many modern political philosophies such as that of Locke, for example the fact that Hegel commences here does not testify to any ontological assumption that the consciously willing and right-bearing individual is the basic atom from which all society can be understood as constructed—an idea at the heart of standard social contract theories.

Just as the categories of the Logic develop in a way meant to demonstrate that what had at the start been conceived as simple is in fact only made determinate in virtue of its being a functional part of some larger structure or process, here too it is meant to be shown that any simple willing and right-bearing subject only gains its determinacy in virtue of a place it finds for itself in a larger social, and ultimately historical, structure or process.

Thus, even a contractual exchange the minimal social interaction for contract theorists is not to be thought simply as an occurrence consequent upon the existence of two beings with natural animal wants and some natural calculative rationality, as in Hobbes, say; rather, the system of interaction within which individual exchanges take place the economy will be treated holistically as a culturally-shaped form of social life within which the actual wants of individuals as well as their reasoning powers are given determinate forms.

Hegel is well aware of the distinctive modernity of this form of social-life. Here too it becomes apparent that Hegel, taking up themes from the Phenomenology, follows Fichte in treating property in terms of a recognitive analysis of the nature of such a right. Such an interactive constitution of the common will means that for Hegel that the identity among wills is achieved because of not in spite of co-existing differences between the particular wills of the subjects involved: while contracting individuals both will the same exchange, at a more concrete level, they do so with different ends in mind.

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