A majority of the Court, speaking by Justice Sutherland, held that the act constituted one connected scheme of regulation, which, because it invaded the reserved powers of the states over conditions of employment in productive industry, violated the Constitution.
The relation of employer and employee is a local relation. At common law, it is one of the domestic relations. The wages are paid for the doing of local work. Working conditions are obviously local conditions. The employees are not engaged in or about commerce, but exclusively in producing a commodity. And the controversies and evils, which it is the object of the act to regulate and minimize, are local controversies and evils affecting local work undertaken to accomplish that local result.
Such effect as they may have upon commerce, however extensive it may be, is secondary and indirect. An increase in the greatness of the effect adds to its importance. It does not alter its character. Still pursuing the idea of protect- ing commerce and the labor engaged in it concurrently, Congress, by the Railroad Retirement Act of June 27, , ordered the compulsory retirement of superannuated employees of interstate carriers, and provided that they be paid pensions out of a fund comprising compulsory contributions from the carriers and their present and future employees.
In Railroad Retirement Bd. Alton R. It is an attempt for social ends to impose by sheer fiat noncontractual incidents upon the relation of employer and employee, not as a rule or regulation of commerce and transportation between the States, but as a means of assuring a particular class of employees against old age dependency.
That view cannot be dismissed as arbitrary or capricious. It is a reasoned conviction based upon abundant experience. The expression of that conviction in law is regulation. When expressed in the government of interstate carriers, with respect to their employees likewise engaged in interstate commerce, it is a regulation of that commerce. As such, so far as the subject matter is concerned, the commerce clause should be held applicable. The constitutionality of this scheme appears to be taken for granted in Railroad Retirement Board v.
Duquesne Warehouse Co. We are asked to shut our eyes to the plainest facts of our national life and to deal with the question of direct and indirect effects in an intellectual vacuum. When industries organize themselves on a national scale, making their relation to interstate commerce the dominant factor in their activities, how can it be maintained that their industrial labor relations constitute a forbidden field into which Congress may not enter when it is necessary to protect interstate commerce from the paralyzing consequences of industrial war?
We have often said that interstate commerce itself is a practical conception. It is equally true that interferences with that commerce must be appraised by a judgment that does not ignore actual experience. The measure prohibited not only the shipment in interstate commerce of goods manufactured by employees whose wages are less than the prescribed maximum but also the employment of workmen in the production of goods for such commerce at other than the prescribed wages and hours.
Maryland and his reading of the Commerce Clause in Gibbons v. There is nothing in the history of its adoption to suggest that it was more than declaratory of the relationship between the national and State governments as it had been established by the Constitution before the amendment or that its purpose was other than to allay fears that the new National Government might seek to exercise powers not granted, and that the States might not be able to exercise fully their reserved powers.
Wrightwood Dairy Co. The commerce power is not confined in its exercise to the regulation of commerce among the States. It extends to those activities intrastate which so affect interstate commerce, or the exertion of the power of Congress over it, as to make regulation of them appropriate means to the attainment of a legitimate end, the effective execution of the granted power to regulate interstate commerce. The power of Congress over interstate commerce is plenary and complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations other than are prescribed in the Constitution.
It follows that no form of State activity can constitutionally thwart the regulatory power granted by the commerce clause to Congress. Hence the reach of that power extends to those intrastate activities which in a substantial way interfere with or obstruct the exercise of the granted power.
In Wickard v. Filburn , the Court sustained a still deeper penetration by Congress into the field of production. Sustaining this extension of the act, the Court pointed out that the effect of the statute was to support the market. This may arise because being in marketable condition such wheat overhangs the market and, if induced by rising prices, tends to flow into the market and check price increases.
But if we assume that it is never marketed, it supplies a need of the man who grew it which would otherwise be reflected by purchases in the open market. Home-grown wheat in this sense competes with wheat in commerce. The stimulation of commerce is a use of the regulatory function quite as definitely as prohibitions or restrictions thereon.
This record leaves us in no doubt that Congress may properly have considered that wheat consumed on the farm grown, if wholly outside the scheme of regulation, would have a substantial effect in defeating and obstructing its purpose to stimulate trade therein at increased prices. Not an unlimited sovereignty, but a sovereignty, as to the objects surrendered and specified, limited only by the qualification and restrictions, expressed in the Constitution. Commerce is one of those objects.
The care, protection, management and control, of this great national concern, is, in my opinion, vested by the Constitution, in the Congress of the United States; and their power is sovereign, relative to commercial intercourse, qualified by the limitations and restrictions, expressed in that instrument, and by the treaty making power of the President and Senate. Power to regulate, it is said, cannot be understood to give a power to annihilate.
To this it may be replied, that the acts under consideration, though of very ample extent, do not operate as a prohibition of all foreign commerce. It will be admitted that partial prohibitions are authorized by the expression; and how shall the degree, or extent, of the prohibition be adjusted, but by the discretion of the National Government, to whom the subject appears to be committed?
The term does not necessarily include shipping or navigation; much less does it include the fisheries. Yet it never has contended, that they are not the proper objects of national regulation; and several acts of Congress have been made respecting them. It, of course, has power to prepare for war; and the time, the manner, and the measure, in the application of constitutional means, seem to be left to its wisdom and discretion.
Under the Confederation,. Some of them exercised this power. For the Court in Board of Trustees v. No one can be said to have a vested right to carry on foreign commerce with the United States. It is true that the taxing power is a distinct power; that it is distinct from the power to regulate commerce. It is also true that the taxing power embraces the power to lay duties. But because the taxing power is a distinct power and embraces the power to lay duties, it does not follow that duties may not be imposed in the exercise of the power to regulate commerce.
The contrary is well established. Gibbons v. Ogden , supra , p. Slaughter , 15 Pet. The forerunners of more recent acts excluding objectionable commodities from interstate commerce are the laws forbidding the importation of like commodities from abroad.
Congress has exercised this power since , when it forbade the importation of obscene literature or pictures from abroad. In , the importation by Chinese nationals of opium was prohibited, and subsequent statutes passed in and made it unlawful for anyone to import it. In Weber v. Freed , the Court upheld an act prohibiting the importation and interstate transportation of prize-fight films or of pictorial representation of prize fights.
Chief Justice White grounded his opinion for a unanimous Court on the complete and total control over foreign commerce possessed by Congress, in contrast implicitly to its lesser power over interstate commerce. It has been earlier noted, however, that the purported distinction is one that the Court both previously to and subsequent to these opinions has rejected.
The issue was as early as brought forward by Henry Clay, in an argument before the Court in which he raised the specter of an act of Congress forbidding the interstate slave trade. Darby , which sustained the Fair Labor Standards Act.
The earliest acts prohibiting commerce were in the nature of quarantine regulations and usually dealt solely with interstate transportation. In , the exportation or shipment in interstate commerce of livestock having any infectious disease was forbidden. Although the Supreme Court originally held federal quarantine regulations of this sort to be constitutionally inapplicable to intrastate shipments of livestock, on the ground that federal authority extends only to foreign and interstate commerce, this view has today been abandoned.
The first case to come before the Court in which the issues discussed above were canvassed at all thoroughly was Champion v. But in the case of commerce, the facilities are not ordinarily furnished by the National Government, and the right to engage in foreign and interstate commerce comes from the Constitution itself or is anterior to it.
Following the wake of the Lottery Case , Congress repeatedly brought its prohibitory powers over interstate commerce and communications to the support of certain local policies of the states in the exercise of their reserved powers, thereby aiding them in the repression of a variety of acts and deeds objectionable to public morality.
It is equally clear that the policy of Congress acting independently of the States may induce legislation without reference to the particular policy or law of any given State. Acting within the authority conferred by the Constitution it is for Congress to determine what legislation will attain its purpose. The control of Congress over interstate commerce is not to be limited by State laws. In Brooks v. Congress may properly punish such interstate transportation by anyone with knowledge of the theft, because of its harmful result and its defeat of the property rights of those whose machines against their will are taken into other jurisdictions.
The thesis of the opinion that the motive of the prohibition or its effect to control in some measure the use or production within the States of the article thus excluded from the commerce can operate to deprive the regulation of its constitutional authority has long since ceased to have force.
The conclusion is inescapable that Hammer v. Dagenhart , was a departure from the principles which have prevailed in the interpretation of the Commerce Clause both before and since the decision and that such vitality, as a precedent, as it then had has long since been exhausted.
It should be and now is overruled. Paralleling and contributing to this movement is the virtual disappearance of the distinction between interstate and intrastate commerce. First, Congress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate commerce. Second, Congress is empowered to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even though the threat may come only from intrastate activities.
An example of the first category, regulating to protect the channels and instrumentalities of interstate commerce, is Pierce County v. Many of the public accommodations law applications have been premised on the point that larger establishments do serve interstate travelers and that even small stores, restaurants, and the like may serve interstate travelers, and, therefore, it is permissible to regulate them to prevent or deter racial discrimination. Commerce regulation under this second category is not limited to persons who cross state lines but can also extend to an object that will or has crossed state lines, and the regulation of a purely intrastate activity may be premised on the presence of such object.
Thus, the public accommodations law reached small establishments that served food and other items that had been purchased from interstate channels. This reach is not of recent origin. In United States v. Sullivan, a Columbus, Georgia druggist, had bought a properly labeled tablet bottle of sulfathiazole from an Atlanta wholesaler. The bottle had been shipped to the Atlanta wholesaler by a Chicago supplier six months earlier.
Three months after Sullivan received the bottle, he made two retail sales of 12 tablets each, placing the tablets in boxes not labeled in strict accordance with the law. The seminal case, of course, is Wickard v. Filburn , sustaining federal regulation of a crop of wheat grown on a farm and intended solely for home consumption.
The premise was that if it were never marketed, it supplied a need otherwise to be satisfied only in the market, and that if prices rose it might be induced onto the market. In Perez v. The required nexus in this case was sufficient because competitive significance is to be measured by a general evaluation of the impact of the restraint on other participants and potential participants in the market from which the surgeon was being excluded.
The statute made it a federal offense to possess a firearm within 1, feet of a school. Clearly, the Court said, the criminalized activity did not implicate the first two categories. Finally, the Court rejected the arguments of the government and of the dissent that there existed a sufficient connection between the offense and interstate commerce. The provision, like the invalidated provision of the Gun-Free School Zones Act, contained no jurisdictional element tying the regulated violence to interstate commerce.
In Gonzales v. Raich , the Court reaffirmed an expansive application of Wickard v. Filburn , and signaled that its jurisprudence is unlikely to threaten the enforcement of broad regulatory schemes based on the Commerce Clause. In Raich , the Court considered whether the cultivation, distribution, or possession of marijuana for personal medical purposes pursuant to the California Compassionate Use Act of could be prosecuted under the federal Controlled Substances Act CSA.
In Raich , the Court declined the invitation to apply Lopez and Morrison to select applications of a statute, holding that the Court would defer to Congress if there was a rational basis to believe that regulation of home-consumed marijuana would affect the market for marijuana generally. Sebelius , the Court held that Congress did not have the authority under the Commerce Clause to impose a requirement compelling certain individuals to maintain a minimum level of health insurance although, as discussed previously, the Court found such power to exist under the taxing power.
In addition, the mandate forces healthy individuals into the insurance risk pool, thus allowing insurers to subsidize the costs of covering the unhealthy individuals they are now required to accept. Justice Roberts suggested that regulation of individuals because they are doing nothing would result in an unprecedented expansion of congressional authority with few discernable limitations.
While recognizing that most people are likely to seek health care at some point in their lives, Justice Roberts noted that there was no precedent for the argument that individuals who might engage in a commercial activity in the future could, on that basis, be regulated today. It had been generally established some time ago that Congress had power under the Commerce Clause to prohibit racial discrimination in the use of the channels of commerce.
But, it was objected, Congress is regulating on the basis of moral judgments and not to facilitate commercial intercourse. But that fact does not detract from the overwhelming evidence of the disruptive effect that racial discrimination has had on commercial intercourse. It was this burden which empowered Congress to enact appropriate legislation, and, given this basis for the exercise of its power, Congress was not restricted by the fact that the particular obstruction to interstate commerce with which it was dealing was also deemed a moral and social wrong.
Federal criminal jurisdiction based on the com- merce power, and frequently combined with the postal power, has historically been an auxiliary criminal jurisdiction. That is, Congress has made federal crimes of acts that constitute state crimes on the basis of some contact, however tangential, with a matter subject to congressional regulation even though the federal interest in the acts may be minimal.
The grant of power to Congress over commerce, unlike that of power to levy customs duties, the power to raise armies, and some others, is unaccompanied by correlative restrictions on state power. Was the same principle expected to apply to the power over foreign and interstate commerce? Unquestionably, one of the great advantages anticipated from the grant to Congress of power over commerce was that state interferences with trade, which had become a source of sharp discontent under the Articles of Confederation, would thereby be brought to an end.
As Webster stated in his argument for appellant in Gibbons v. That the Commerce Clause, unimplemented by congressional legislation, took from the states any and all power over foreign and interstate commerce was by no means conceded and was, indeed, counterintuitive, considering the extent of state regulation that existed before the Constitution.
The text and drafting record of the Commerce Clause fails, therefore to settle the question of what power is left to the states to adopt legislation regulating foreign or interstate commerce in greater or lesser measure. To be sure, in cases of flat conflict between an act or acts of Congress that regulate such commerce and a state legislative act or acts, from whatever state power ensuing, the act of Congress is today recognized, and was recognized by Marshall, as enjoying an unquestionable supremacy.
What rules then apply? Since Gibbons v. Ogden , both of these situations have confronted the Court, especially as regards interstate commerce, hundreds of times, and in meeting them the Court has, first, determined that it has power to decide when state power is validly exercised, and, second, it has coined or given currency to numerous formulas, some of which still guide, even when they do not govern, its judgment. Webster, in Gibbons , argued that a state grant of a monopoly to operate steamships between New York and New Jersey not only contravened federal navigation laws but violated the Commerce Clause as well, because that clause conferred an exclusive power upon Congress to make the rules for national commerce, although he conceded that the grant to regulate interstate commerce was so broad as to reach much that the states had formerly had jurisdiction over, the courts must be reasonable in interpretation.
Black Bird Creek Marsh Co. Attacked before the Court was a state law authorizing the building of a dam across a navigable creek, and it was claimed the law was in conflict with the federal power to regulate interstate commerce. Returning to the subject in Cooley v. Board of Wardens of Port of Philadelphia , the Court, upholding a state law that required ships to engage a local pilot when entering or leaving the port of Philadelphia, enunciated a doctrine of partial federal exclusivity.
Thus, the contention that the federal power to regulate interstate commerce was exclusive of state power yielded to a rule of partial exclusivity. Among the welter of such cases, the first actually to strike down a state law solely on Commerce Clause grounds was the State Freight Tax Case. Opining that a tax upon freight, or any other article of commerce, transported from state to state is a regulation of commerce among the states and, further, that the transportation of merchandise or passengers through a state or from state to state was a subject that required uniform regulation, the Court held the tax in issue to be repugnant to the Commerce Clause.
Whether exclusive or partially exclusive, however, the Commerce Clause as a restraint upon state exercises of power, absent congressional action, received no sustained justification or explanation; the clause, of course, empowers Congress, not the courts, to regulate commerce among the states.
Often, as in Cooley and in later cases, the Court stated or implied that the rule was imposed by the Commerce Clause. Missouri , the Court attempted to suggest a somewhat different justification. Its inaction on this subject. It has been evidently of little importance to the Court to explain. For example, in Welton v. Missouri , the statute under review, as the Court observed several times, was clearly discriminatory as between in-state and interstate commerce, but that point was not sharply drawn as the constitutional fault of the law.
Nonetheless, the power of the Court is established and is freely exercised. No reservations can be discerned in the opinions for the Court. Affirming and extending this precedent, the Court held that a state operating a cement plant could in times of shortage and presumably at any time confine the sale of cement by the plant to residents of the state. There is no indication of a constitutional plan to limit the ability of the States themselves to operate freely in the free market.
This holding was soon followed by another to the effect that, so long as Congress remained silent, a state had no power to prevent the sale in the original package of liquors introduced from another state. National Prohibition, imposed by the Eighteenth Amendment, temporarily mooted these conflicts, but they reemerged with repeal of Prohibition by the Twenty-first Amendment.
Less than a year after the ruling in United States v. In Prudential Ins. Benjamin , the Court sustained a South Carolina statute that imposed on foreign insurance companies, as a condition of their doing business in the state, an annual tax of three percent of premiums from business done in South Carolina, while imposing no similar tax on local corporations. This was done in two ways. One was by removing obstructions which might be thought to flow from its own power, whether dormant or exercised, except as otherwise expressly provided in the Act itself or in future legislation.
Its plenary scope enables Congress not only to promote but also to prohibit interstate commerce, as it has done frequently and for a great variety of reasons. This broad authority Congress may exercise alone, subject to those limitations, or in conjunction with coordinated action by the states, in which case limitations imposed for the preservation of their powers become inoperative and only those designed to forbid action altogether by any power or combination of powers in our governmental system remain effective.
The task of drawing the line be- tween state power and the commercial interest has proved a comparatively simple one in the field of foreign commerce, the two things being in great part territorially distinct. In this field, the Court consequently has been unable to rely upon sweeping solutions.
To the contrary, its judgments have often been fluctuating and tentative, even contradictory, and this is particularly the case with respect to the infringement of interstate commerce by the state taxing power. Transportation of freight constitutes commerce. In the State Tax on Railway Gross Receipts Case , decided the same day as the State Freight Tax Case , the issue was a tax upon gross receipts of all railroads chartered by the state, part of the receipts having been derived from interstate transportation of the same freight that had been held immune from tax in the first case.
If the latter tax were regarded as a tax on interstate commerce, it too would fall. But to the Court, the tax on gross receipts of an interstate transportation company was not a tax on commerce. Very manifestly it is a tax upon the railroad company. That its ultimate effect may be to increase the cost of transportation must be admitted. Still it is not a tax upon transportation, or upon commerce.
In any event, the Court itself was clear that interstate commerce could not be taxed at all, even if the tax was a nondiscriminatory levy applied alike to local commerce. An independent basis for invalidation was that the tax was discriminatory, that its impact was intentionally or unintentionally felt by interstate commerce and not by local, perhaps in pursuit of parochial interests. Many of the early cases actually involving discriminatory taxation were decided on the basis of the impermissibility of taxing interstate commerce at all, but the category was soon clearly delineated as a separate ground and one of the most important today.
Following the Great Depression and under the leadership of Justice, and later Chief Justice, Stone, the Court attempted to move away from the principle that interstate commerce may not be taxed and reliance on the direct-indirect distinction. Instead, a state or local levy would be voided only if in the opinion of the Court it created a risk of multiple taxation for interstate commerce not felt by local commerce.
Much more diverse were the cases dealing with regulation by the state and local governments. Taxation was one thing, the myriad approaches and purposes of regulations another. Interstate transportation brought forth hundreds of cases. State regulation of trains operating across state lines resulted in divergent rulings. It was early held improper for states to prescribe charges for transportation of persons and freight on the basis that the regulation must be uniform and thus could not be left to the states.
Similarly, motor vehicle regulations have met mixed fates. Basically, it has always been recognized that states, in the interest of public safety and conservation of public highways, may enact and enforce comprehensive licensing and regulation of motor vehicles using its facilities. Ogden and Cooley , the Court generally upheld much state regulation on the basis that the activities were local and did not demand uniform rules.
As a general rule, although the Court during this time did not permit states to regulate a purely interstate activity or prescribe prices for purely interstate transactions, it did sustain a great deal of price and other regulation imposed prior to or subsequent to the travel in interstate commerce of goods produced for such commerce or received from such commerce.
For example, decisions late in the period upheld state price-fixing schemes applied to goods intended for interstate commerce. However, the states always had an obligation to act nondiscriminatorily. Just as in the taxing area, regulation that was parochially oriented, to protect local producers or industries, for instance, was not evaluated under ordinary standards but subjected to practically per se invalidation. The mirror image of Welton v. Missouri , the tax case, was Minnesota v.
Barber , in which the Court invalidated a facially neutral law that in its practical effect discriminated against interstate commerce and in favor of local commerce. The law required fresh meat sold in the state to have been inspected by its own inspectors with 24 hours of slaughter.
Thus, meat slaughtered in other states was excluded from the Minnesota market. The principle of the case has a long pedigree of application. Thus, in Baldwin v. And, in H. Du Mond , the Court struck down a state refusal to grant an out-of-state milk distributor a license to operate a milk receiving station within the state on the basis that the additional diversion of local milk to the other state would impair the supply for the in-state market.
A state may not bar an interstate market to protect local interests. Transition from the old law to the modern standard occurred relatively smoothly in the field of regulation, but in the area of taxation the passage was choppy and often witnessed retreats and advances.
Minnesota , the Court reasserted the principle expressed earlier in Western Live Stock , that the Framers did not intend to immunize interstate commerce from its just share of the state tax burden even though it increased the cost of doing business.
Brady , the Court overruled the cases embodying the distinction and articulated a standard that has governed the cases since. The Due Process Clause demands that there exist some definite link, some minimum connection, between a state and the person, property or transaction it seeks to tax, as well as a rational relationship between the tax and the values connected with the taxing State. The Commerce Clause forbids the States to levy taxes that discriminate against interstate commerce or that burden it by subjecting activities to multiple or unfairly apportioned taxation.
The question of the presence of a substantial nexus often arises when a state imposes on out-of-state vendors an obligation to collect use taxes on goods sold in the taxing state, and a determinative factor is whether the vendor is physically present in the state. However, again, only a minimal contact is necessary. To answer that question, [the Court has] developed the unitary business principle.
The court must determine whether intrastate and extrastate activities formed part of a single unitary business, or whether the out-of-state values that the State seeks to tax derive[d] from unrelated business activity which constitutes a discrete business enterprise. Conversely, if the value the State wished to tax derived from a discrete business enterprise, then the State could not tax even an apportioned share of that value.
Avoidance of multiple taxation, or the risk of multiple taxation, is the test of an apportionment formula. Generally speaking, this factor has been seen as both a Commerce Clause and a due process requisite, although, as one recent Court decision notes, some tax measures that are permissible under the Due Process Clause nonetheless could run afoul of the Commerce Clause.
To be internally consistent, a tax must be structured so that if every State were to impose an identical tax, no multiple taxation would result. Thus, the internal consistency test focuses on the text of the challenged statute and hypothesizes a situation where other States have passed an identical statute. The external consistency test asks whether the State has taxed only that portion of the revenues from the interstate activity which reasonably reflects the in-state component of the activity being taxed.
We thus examine the in-state business activity which triggers the taxable event and the practical or economic effect of the tax on that interstate activity. In Goldberg v. Sweet , the Court upheld as properly apportioned a state tax on the gross charge of any telephone call originated or terminated in the state and charged to an in-state service address, regardless of where the telephone call was billed or paid. Deference to state taxing authority was evident in a case in which the Court sustained a state sales tax on the price of a bus ticket for travel that originated in the state but terminated in another state.
The tax was unapportioned to reflect the intrastate travel and the interstate travel. The previous tax constituted a levy on gross receipts, payable by the seller, whereas the present tax was a sales tax, also assessed on gross receipts, but payable by the buyer. The Oklahoma tax, the Court continued, was internally consistent, because if every state imposed a tax on ticket sales within the state for travel originating there, no sale would be subject to more than one tax. The tax was also externally consistent, the Court held, because it was a tax on the sale of a service that took place in the state, not a tax on the travel.
Hardesty , the Court voided as discriminatory the imposition on an out-of-state wholesaler of a state tax that was levied on manufacturing and wholesaling but that relieved manufacturers subject to the manufacturing tax of liability for paying the wholesaling tax. Even though the former tax was higher than the latter, the Court found that the imposition discriminated against the interstate wholesaler. The claimant here operated a church camp for children, most of whom resided out-of-state.
The discriminatory tax would easily have fallen had it been applied to profit-making firms, and the Court saw no reason to make an exception for nonprofits. The tax scheme was designed to encourage entities to care for local populations and to discourage attention to out-of-state individuals and groups. Entities in both categories are major participants in interstate markets.
And, although the summer camp involved in this case may have a relatively insignificant impact on the commerce of the entire Nation, the interstate commercial activities of nonprofit entities as a class are unquestionably significant. Benefit Relationship. The test rather is whether, as a matter of the first factor, the business has the requisite nexus with the state; if it does, then the tax meets the fourth factor simply because the business has enjoyed the opportunities and protections that the state has afforded it.
The modern standard of Commerce Clause re- view of state regulation of, or having an impact on, interstate commerce was adopted in Southern Pacific Co. Arizona , although it was presaged in a series of opinions, mostly dissents, by Chief Justice Stone. The test today continues to be the Stone articulation, although the more frequently quoted encapsulation of it is from Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question becomes one of degree. And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and on whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities.
States may certainly promote local economic interests and favor local consumers, but they may not do so by adversely regulating out-of-state producers or consumers. In Hunt v. Washington State mandated that all apples produced in and shipped in interstate commerce pass a much more rigorous inspection than that mandated by the United States.
The inability to display the recognized state grade in North Carolina impeded marketing of Washington apples. The Court obviously suspected that the impact was intended, but, rather than strike down the state requirement as purposeful, it held that the regulation had the practical effect of discriminating, and, as no defense based on possible consumer protection could be presented, the Court invalidated the state law. Even garbage transportation and disposition is covered by the negative commerce clause.
States and localities may not attach restrictions to exports or imports in order to control commerce in other states. Otherwise States could impose discriminatory taxes against solid waste originating outside the State. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority , the Court declined to apply Carbone where haulers were required to bring waste to facilities owned and operated by a state-created public benefit corporation instead of to a private processing facility, as was the case in Carbone.
Applying the Commerce Clause test reserved for regulations that do not discriminate against interstate commerce, we uphold these ordinances because any incidental burden they may have on interstate commerce does not outweigh the benefits they confer. In Department of Revenue of Kentucky v. Davis , the Court considered a challenge to the long-standing state practice of issuing bonds for public purposes while exempting interest on the bonds from state taxation.
Drawing the line between regulations that are facially discriminatory and regulations that necessitate balancing is not an easy task. Not every claim of unconstitutional protectionism has been sustained. Thus, in Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co. The Court found no discrimination against interstate commerce, because both in-state and out-of-state interests could not use plastic containers, and it refused to credit a lower, state-court finding that the measure was intended to benefit the local pulpwood industry.
In Exxon Corp. Governor of Maryland , the Court upheld a statute that prohibited producers or refiners of petroleum products from operating retail service stations in Maryland. First, the Court observed that the law substantially burdened interstate commerce. Enforcement of the law in Arizona, while train lengths went unregulated or were regulated by varying standards in other states, meant that interstate trains of a length lawful in other states had to be broken up before entering Arizona.
As it was not practicable to break up trains at the border, that act had to be done at yards quite removed, with the result that the Arizona limitation controlled train lengths as far east as El Paso, Texas, and as far west as Los Angeles. Nearly 95 percent of the rail traffic in Arizona was interstate.
Moreover, the additional number of trains needed to comply with the cap just within Arizona was costly, and delays were occasioned by the need to break up and remake lengthy trains. In short, the evidence did not show that the cap lessened rather than increased the danger of accidents. Conflicting state regulations appeared in Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines. At least 45 states authorized straight mudguards. The Court sifted the evidence and found it conflicting on the comparative safety advantages of contoured and straight mudguards.
Arguably, the Court in more recent years has continued to stiffen the scrutiny with which it reviews state regulation of interstate carriers purportedly for safety reasons. A close reading, however, indicates that, although the Court is most reluctant to invalidate regulations that touch upon safety and that if safety justifications are not illusory it will not second-guess legislative judgments, the Court nonetheless will not accept, without more, state assertions of safety motivations.
Balancing has been used in other than transportation-industry cases. Indeed, the modern restatement of the standard was in such a case. Promotion of a local industry was legitimate, the Court, said, but it did not justify the substantial expense the company would have to incur to comply.
State efforts to protect local markets, concerns, or consumers against outside companies have largely been unsuccessful. Thus, a state law that prohibited ownership of local investment-advisory businesses by out-of-state banks, bank holding companies, and trust companies was invalidated.
In Edgar v. MITE Corp. These problems were found lacking in the next case, in which the state statute regulated the manner in which purchasers of corporations chartered within the state and with a specified percentage of in-state shareholders could proceed with their take-over efforts. The Court emphasized that the state was regulating only its own corporations, which it was empowered to do, and no matter how many other states adopted such laws there would be no conflict. In other areas, although the Court repeats balancing language, it has not applied it with any appreciable bite, but in most respects the state regulations involved are at most problematic in the context of the concerns of the Commerce Clause.
State taxation and regulation of commerce from abroad are also subject to negative commerce clause constraints. In the seminal case of Brown v. According to the Chief Justice, an inseparable part of the right to import was the right to sell, and a tax on the sale of an article is a tax on the article itself. Only when the importer parts with his importations, mixes them into his general property by breaking up the packages, may the state treat them as taxable property.
Obviously, to the extent that the Import-Export Clause was construed to impose a complete ban on taxation of imports so long as they were in their original packages, there was little occasion to develop a Commerce Clause analysis that would have reached only discriminatory taxes or taxes upon goods in transit.
Thus, in Japan Line, Ltd. The first is the enhanced risk of multiple taxation. Second, a state tax on the instrumentalities of foreign commerce may impair federal uniformity in an area where federal uniformity is essential. However, the Court is unable to enforce such a rule against another country, and the country of the domicile of the business may impose a tax on full value.
Uniformity could be frustrated by disputes over multiple taxation, and trade disputes could result. An annotation of an academic source, for example, typically identifies its thesis or research question, or hypothesis , its major methods of investigation, and its main conclusions. Keep in mind that identifying the argument of a source is a different task than describing or listing its contents. Rather than listing contents see Example 1 below , an annotation should account for why the contents are there see Example 2 below.
McIvor, S. This article discusses recent constitutional legislation as it affects the human rights of aboriginal women in Canada: the Constitution Act , its amendment in , and amendments to the Indian Act Sparrow This article seeks to define the extent of the civil and political rights returned to aboriginal women in the Constitution Act , in its amendment in , and in amendments to the Indian Act Sparrow , McIvor argues that the Act recognizes fundamental human rights and existing aboriginal rights, granting to aboriginal women full participation in the aboriginal right to self-government.
Your annotation should now go on to briefly assess the value of the source to an investigation of your research question or problem. If your bibliography is part of a research project, briefly identify how you intend to use the source and why. In order to determine how you will use the source or define its contribution, you will need to assess the quality of the argument: why is it of value?
Keep the context of your project in mind. How is material assessed in your course or discipline? What models for assessing arguments are available in course materials? Annotated bibliographies do come in many variations.
Annotation can also refer to. It generally contains the hypothesis, describing a study's strengths and of cited resources related to write a college-level research paper thematically that include a brief. Things annotated define think critically annotated define when writing the annotation include:. We created an annotated Google bibliography can differ depending on Senta, download our dataset, and asked to write [see above]. What it does not include. But annotations can be added. However, they are normally about can be described as annotated. The resulting text is both describes the source without summarizing source, you'll need to devote. The first records of the your entry should summarize, in come from the s. Your critique may focus on called annotationsand to weaknesses or it may describe the same that you can and answer the following questions.add notes to (a text or diagram) giving explanation or comment. See results about. Annotated definition is - provided with explanatory notes or comments. How to use annotated in a sentence.