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Write investments literature review topic ideas argument essays

Write investments literature review

You are currently using the site but have requested a page in the site. Would you like to change to the site? Boettger Series Editor. Is a literature review looming in your future? Are you procrastinating on writing a literature review at this very moment? If so, this is the book for you. Writing often causes trepidation and procrastination for engineering students—issues that compound while writing a literature review, a type of academic writing most engineers are never formally taught.

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The annual flow of money into venture capital during its first three decades never exceeded a few hundred million dollars and usually was substantially less. The activity in the venture industry increased dramatically in the late s and early s. Industry observers attributed much of the shift to the U. Prior to that year, ERISA regulations limited pension funds from investing substantial amounts of money in venture capital or other high-risk asset classes.

Pension funds supplied just 15 percent. These annual commitments represent pledges of capital to venture funds raised in a given year. This money typically is invested over three to five years, starting in the year the fund is formed. The subsequent years saw both very good and trying times for venture capitalists. On the one hand, venture capitalists had backed during the s and s many of the most successful high-technology companies, including Apple Computer, Cisco Systems, Genentech, Netscape, and Sun Microsystems.

At the same time, commitments to the venture capital industry were very uneven. The annual flow of money into venture funds increased by a factor of 10 during the early s, peaking at just under 6 billion dollars. From through , however, fund-raising steadily declined. This process of rapid growth and decline has created a great deal of instability in the industry. To address the information problems that preclude other investors in small high-technology firms, the partners at venture capital organizations employ a variety of mechanisms.

First, business plans are intensively scrutinized: Of those firms that submit business plans to venture capital organizations, historically fewer than 1 percent have been funded Fenn et al. The decision to invest frequently is made conditional on the identification of a syndication partner who agrees that this is an attractive investment Lerner, In exchange for their capital, the venture capital investors demand preferred stock with numerous restrictive covenants and representation on the board of directors.

Once the decision to invest is made, the venture capitalists frequently disburse funds in stages. Managers of these venture-backed firms are forced to return repeatedly to their financiers for additional capital in order to ensure that the money is not squandered on unprofitable projects.

In addition, venture capitalists intensively monitor managers, often contacting firms on a daily basis and holding monthly board meetings during which extensive reviews of every aspect of the firm are conducted. Various aspects of the oversight role played by ven-. Note that, even with these many mechanisms, the most likely primary outcome of a venture-backed investment is failure or, at best, modest success. Gompers documents that, out of a sample of venture capital investments made over three decades, only The next best alternative, a similar investment in an acquired firm, yields a cash return of only 40 cents over a 3.

About one in six investments was a complete loss, while 45 percent were either losses or simply broke even. The elimination of the top-performing 9 percent of the investments was sufficient to turn a 19 percent gross rate of return into a negative return. In short, the environment in which venture organizations operate is extremely difficult.

These circumstances have led to venture capital organizations emerging as the dominant form of equity financing for privately held technology-intensive businesses. At the same time, there are reasons to believe that despite the presence of venture capital funds, there still might be a role for public venture capital programs.

In this section, we assess these claims. We highlight two arguments: that public venture capital programs may play an important role by certifying firms to outside investors, and that these programs may encourage technological spillovers. We then highlight two classes of problems that can affect these programs.

A growing body of empirical research suggests that new firms, especially technology-intensive ones, may receive insufficient capital because of the infor-. As discussed earlier, venture capitalists specialize in financing these types of firms. They address these information problems through a variety of mechanisms. Many of the studies that document capital-raising problems examine firms during the s and early s, when the venture capital pool was relatively modest in size.

Since the pool of venture capital funds has grown dramatically in recent years Gompers and Lerner, , a , even if small high-technology firms had numerous value-creating projects that they could not finance in the past, one might argue that it is not clear that this problem remains today.

A response to this argument emphasizes the limitations of the venture capital industry. Venture capitalists back only a tiny fraction of the technology-oriented businesses begun each year. In , a record year for venture disbursements, companies received venture financing for the first time VentureOne, ; to put this in perspective, the Small Business Administration estimates that in recent years close to one million businesses have been started annually.

Furthermore, these funds have been very concentrated: 49 percent of venture funding in went to companies based in either California or Massachusetts, and 82 percent went to firms specializing in information technology and the life sciences VentureOne, It is not clear, however, what lessons to draw from these funding patterns.

Concentrating investments in such a manner may well be an appropriate response to the nature of opportunities. Consider, for instance, the geographic concentration of awards. Recent models of economic growth—building on earlier works by economic geographers —have emphasized powerful reasons why successful high-technology firms may be very concentrated. The literature highlights several factors that lead similar firms to cluster in particular regions, including knowledge spillovers, specialized labor markets, and the presence of critical intermediate goods producers.

A related argument for public investments is that the structure of venture investments may make them inappropriate for many young firms. Venture funds tend to make quite substantial investments, even in young firms; the mean venture investment in a start-up or early-stage business between and ex-. The literature on capital constraints reviewed by Hubbard [] documents that an inability to obtain external financing limits many forms of business investment.

Particularly relevant are works by Hall , Hao and Jaffe , and Himmelberg and Petersen The substantial size of these investments may be partially a consequence of the demands of institutional investors. The typical venture organization raises a fund structured as a limited partnership every few years.

Furthermore, governance and regulatory considerations lead institutions to limit the share of any fund that any one limited partner holds. Consequently, venture organizations are unwilling to invest in very young firms that require only small capital infusions. This problem may be increasing in severity with the growth of the venture industry, as discussed earlier. As the number of dollars per venture fund and dollars per venture partner has grown, so too has the size of venture investments.

Again, it is not clear what lessons to draw from these financing patterns. Venture capitalists may have eschewed small investments because they were simply not profitable, because of either the high costs associated with these transactions or the poor prospects of the thinly capitalized firms. Support for these claims is found in recent work on the long-run performance of initial public offerings IPOs. Brav and Gompers show that IPOs that had previously received equity financing from venture capitalists outperform other offerings.

These findings underscore concerns about policies that seek to encourage public investments in companies that are rejected by professional investors. Furthermore, it appears that there were in a number of financial innovations to address the needs of early-stage entrepreneurs. The structure of venture partnerships is discussed at length by Gompers and Lerner , a. There are two primary reasons that venture funds do not simply hire more partners if they raise additional capital.

First, the supply of venture capitalists is quite inelastic. The effective oversight of young companies requires highly specialized skills that can only be developed with years of experience. A second important factor is the economics of venture partnerships. The typical venture fund receives a substantial share of its compensation from the annual fee, which is typically between 2 percent and 3 percent of the capital under management.

This motivates venture organizations to increase the capital that each partner manages. For a theoretical discussion of why poorly capitalized firms are less likely to be successful, see Bolton and Scharfstein Finally, some institutional investors are displaying an increased willingness to provide capital to first-time and seed venture funds. Thus, market forces may be addressing whatever problem has existed. Public finance theory emphasizes that subsidies are an appropriate response in the case of activities that generate positive externalities.

Because the firms making the investments are unlikely to capture all the benefits, public subsidies may be appropriate. These spillovers take several forms. For instance, the rents associated with innovations may accrue to competitors who rapidly introduce imitations, developers of complementary products, or to the consumers of these products. After reviewing a wide variety of studies, Griliches estimates that the gap between the private and social rates of return is substantial: The gap is probably equal to between 50 percent and percent of the private rate of return.

Although few studies have examined how these gaps vary with firm characteristics, a number of case-based analyses Jewkes, ; Mansfield et al. These organizations may be particularly unlikely to effectively defend their intellectual property positions or to extract most of the rents in the product market. Even if these problems are substantial, however, the government may not be able to address them dispassionately. An extensive political economy and public finance literature has emphasized the possible distortion that may result from government subsidies as particular interest groups or politicians seek to direct subsidies in a manner that benefits themselves.

As articulated by Olson and Stigler , and formally modeled in works such as those of Peltzman and Becker , the theory of regulatory capture suggests that direct and indirect subsidies will be captured by parties whose joint political activity is. These distortions may manifest themselves in several ways. One possibility discussed, for instance, by Eisinger [] , is that firms may seek transfer payments that directly increase their profits.

Politicians may acquiesce in such transfers in the case of companies that are politically connected. A more subtle distortion is discussed by Cohen and Noll and Wallsten : Officials may seek to select firms based on their likely success, and fund them regardless of whether the government funds are needed. In this section, we examine two classes of problems that affect the design of public venture capital programs.

Second, the structure of the financing may not match the needs of the entrepreneurial firm. Because a lack of results can easily be attributed to the high-risk nature of technology development, many of these companies can avoid accountability indefinitely. As a result, some of these government grant-oriented research organizations are able to drift from one federal contract to the next.

Adding to the problem is the fact that companies with substantial government grant experience appear to have several advantages over other firms when applying for future public awards. Past grants, regardless of project outcomes, help a company to gain legitimacy in a particular area of research as well as to acquire the equipment and personnel needed to do future work. In addition,. General Accounting Office and the Lerner study discussed later.

Because of all of these factors, these firms frequently have a greater chance of being awarded future government grants than other firms. The end result can be a stream of government funding being awarded to companies that consistently underachieve.

In fact, we have encountered examples in which awardees frequently advise first-time applicants on how to write and structure award proposals. For early-stage firms, legal problems may even cause dramatic changes in the size and structure of the company. For early-stage companies, additional limiting factors frequently involve managers who lack experience in running small companies. Although some of these managers may have accumulated business experience as consultants or as members of large organizations, the successful operation of early-stage companies can demand very different management skills.

It thus comes as no surprise that when venture capitalists sink substantial funds in a company, they often place their own hand-picked manager at the helm—typically an individual who has already been successful in managing an early-stage company in a similar industry. Part of the problem in this instance is the lack of corporate discipline. In a broader context, each of these performance-undermining factors emphasizes the need for program managers to critically evaluate whether a particular company is, in fact, a viable vehicle for actually accomplishing its commercialization goals.

This goes far beyond a simple assessment of the feasibility of a business plan. It is tempting, of course, to attribute the failures resulting from such factors to the high-risk nature of the technology. However, to a large extent, companies exhibiting a high potential for under-achievement could be more thoroughly weeded out by placing a greater emphasis on these factors during the selection process.

Regardless of how innovative or enabling a technology may be—or how well a business plan is constructed—if these undermining factors are substantial, a company will be hard pressed to overcome such roadblocks. A second example of inappropriate program design involves the structure of the financing provided.

Before considering the example of the SBIR program, it is worth highlighting the typical attributes of the early-stage, technology-driven firms that are the typical recipients of public venture capital funds. First, a great deal of uncertainty always accompanies these types of firms.

Regardless of the time and energy devoted to such forecasts, it is likely that initial estimates will have to be revised over time. Finally, the firms have a tremendous need to enter the marketplace rapidly. Rapid market entry is critical in the technology-driven industries targeted by public venture capital programs, particularly for small firms without the large marketing budgets that major corporations enjoy.

The primary strength of small firms is their ability to get products into the market quickly. Through such early entry, the small firm may be able to build up a defensible market position, even against larger competitors. Several public venture capital programs have structured their financing in ways that appear to be at odds with these conditions. With respect to SBIR, although it is a multiagency program, the structure of the awards is constrained to be similar across agencies.

This structure was designed to provide many of the same benefits as a staged venture capital financing. Information generated in the first phase of the project would be useful in assessing the application for a Phase II award. In theory, the program managers would be able to make small investments in a wide variety of projects, providing the bulk of the SBIR funds to the most promising of these projects.

Firms believed that the long delays—sometimes two years or more—between the original application and the receipt of the Phase II funds often had a detrimental effect on their ability to commercialize technologies. Because of the characteristics of high-technology firms discussed earlier, these delays often made it difficult for the firm to sustain its innovative effort or to commercialize its findings. As public venture capital programs have increased in number, policy makers and economists increasingly are grappling with the question of how to assess these programs.

Not only do substantial divisions exist between the approaches employed by academics and practitioners, but there is little consensus within the academic community itself about the best evaluation methodologies. In this section, we review some of the most frequently encountered approaches and discuss their strengths and limitations.

The approaches most frequently employed by practitioners have the virtue of being relatively straightforward to implement and communicate. One approach—utilized by many agencies when examining their SBIR programs—has been to highlight successful firms. These approaches have important limitations. First, many awardees may have a stake in the programs that have funded them, and consequently feel inclined to give favorable answers i.

This may be a particular problem in the case of the SBIR initiative. General Accounting Office , , Second, in other cases, the results may be biased the other way: Firms may be unwilling to acknowledge that they received important benefits from participating in public programs, lest they attract unwelcome attention. Third, in many cases, it may simply be very difficult to identify the marginal contribution of a public venture capital award, which may be one of many sources of financing that a firm employed to develop a given technology.

The approaches employed by academics have important limitations as well. The most common approach is to examine in a regression framework the marginal impact of public funding on private research spending. Studies of federal technology programs by academic economists, beginning with Levy and Terleckyj , have tended to focus on the short-run effects of these efforts. In theory, these frameworks should be applicable to the assessment of public venture capital programs.

An analysis along these lines is undertaken by Wallsten He examines whether the SBIR program managers may select firms with too high a probability of success. Every dollar of SBIR funding awards is likely to lead to a reduction of about one dollar of private research spending by the awardee firm. To remain true to its original purpose, Wallsten therefore recommends a restructuring of SBIR policy to fund marginal firms whose commercial success is less certain. However valuable a framework it may be when examining the macroeconomic impact of public expenditures, it is less clear that this econometric approach is appropriate when assessing public efforts to assist small high-technology firms.

In many cases, small high-technology firms are organized around one key scientist or engineer and his research laboratory or product development team. It may well be rational for a firm not to increase its rate of spending, but rather to use the funds to prolong the time before it needs to seek additional capital. To interpret such a short-run reduction in other research spending as a negative signal is very problematic.

A second academic approach is to examine the long-run impact of participation in public venture capital programs on the growth of the firms themselves, relative to a matched set of firms. In this way, it is possible to assess whether either superior firms were selected for the program or participation in the program was associated with ultimate success, although disentangling the two effects, as discussed later, is challenging.

In the context of the SBIR program, Lerner analyzes the growth of 1, SBIR awardees and matching firms over a year period and documents that the awardees appear to have superior employment growth. This approach also has some important limitations. Most fundamentally, policy makers should seek to maximize social, not private, returns. If the growth of the SBIR awardees is merely at the expense of their rivals, the impact of the program on public welfare is likely to be minimal. Second, even the measures of private benefits that can be employed are imperfect.

Ideally, the increase in firm value would be measured. Unfortunately, over 98 percent of the firms were privately held at the time of their first SBIR award. Consequently, assessing the valuation and profitability of these awards is very difficult.

Finally, it is difficult to disentangle whether the superior performance of the awardees is due to the selection of better firms or the positive impact of the awards. Lerner tries to address this issue in a supplemental analysis using the following argument: Firms whose key assets are intangible intellectual property are much harder for outside investors to evaluate using traditional financial measures. If SBIR awards are certifying firm quality to outside investors, then these signals may be particularly valuable in these industries.

SBIR awards should then be more strongly associated with firm growth in high-technology industries. An alternative hypothesis is that federal officials are selecting firms likely to grow rapidly, even without public subsidies. Though the insights of federal officials may give them a greater insight relative to that of other investors and thus make a signal more valuable , it is by no means certain that it is easier to select successful firms in these industries.

Empirical studies suggest that predicting success is much more difficult in high-technology industries.

DISSERTATION EVALUATION FORM UMICH

Her research has been funded through multiple NSF awards. She is the Director of the Engineering Cognitive Research Laboratory E-CRL , where she and her graduate students investigate questions concerning the human side of engineering through a variety of quantitative, qualitative, experimental, and analytical methods.

His teaching expertise includes administrative and organizational writing, grant writing, teambuilding, and strategic communications. His research expertise focuses on natural resource management policy as it relates to landscape-scale impacts on wildlife habitat, hydrologic systems, community resilience, adaptation planning, and long-term land use conservation. Permissions Request permission to reuse content from this site.

Undetected location. NO YES. Selected type: E-Book. Added to Your Shopping Cart. Print on Demand. View on Wiley Online Library. This is a dummy description. Adding to the problem is the fact that companies with substantial government grant experience appear to have several advantages over other firms when applying for future public awards. Past grants, regardless of project outcomes, help a company to gain legitimacy in a particular area of research as well as to acquire the equipment and personnel needed to do future work.

In addition,. General Accounting Office and the Lerner study discussed later. Because of all of these factors, these firms frequently have a greater chance of being awarded future government grants than other firms.

The end result can be a stream of government funding being awarded to companies that consistently underachieve. In fact, we have encountered examples in which awardees frequently advise first-time applicants on how to write and structure award proposals. For early-stage firms, legal problems may even cause dramatic changes in the size and structure of the company. For early-stage companies, additional limiting factors frequently involve managers who lack experience in running small companies.

Although some of these managers may have accumulated business experience as consultants or as members of large organizations, the successful operation of early-stage companies can demand very different management skills. It thus comes as no surprise that when venture capitalists sink substantial funds in a company, they often place their own hand-picked manager at the helm—typically an individual who has already been successful in managing an early-stage company in a similar industry.

Part of the problem in this instance is the lack of corporate discipline. In a broader context, each of these performance-undermining factors emphasizes the need for program managers to critically evaluate whether a particular company is, in fact, a viable vehicle for actually accomplishing its commercialization goals. This goes far beyond a simple assessment of the feasibility of a business plan. It is tempting, of course, to attribute the failures resulting from such factors to the high-risk nature of the technology.

However, to a large extent, companies exhibiting a high potential for under-achievement could be more thoroughly weeded out by placing a greater emphasis on these factors during the selection process. Regardless of how innovative or enabling a technology may be—or how well a business plan is constructed—if these undermining factors are substantial, a company will be hard pressed to overcome such roadblocks.

A second example of inappropriate program design involves the structure of the financing provided. Before considering the example of the SBIR program, it is worth highlighting the typical attributes of the early-stage, technology-driven firms that are the typical recipients of public venture capital funds.

First, a great deal of uncertainty always accompanies these types of firms. Regardless of the time and energy devoted to such forecasts, it is likely that initial estimates will have to be revised over time. Finally, the firms have a tremendous need to enter the marketplace rapidly. Rapid market entry is critical in the technology-driven industries targeted by public venture capital programs, particularly for small firms without the large marketing budgets that major corporations enjoy.

The primary strength of small firms is their ability to get products into the market quickly. Through such early entry, the small firm may be able to build up a defensible market position, even against larger competitors. Several public venture capital programs have structured their financing in ways that appear to be at odds with these conditions. With respect to SBIR, although it is a multiagency program, the structure of the awards is constrained to be similar across agencies.

This structure was designed to provide many of the same benefits as a staged venture capital financing. Information generated in the first phase of the project would be useful in assessing the application for a Phase II award. In theory, the program managers would be able to make small investments in a wide variety of projects, providing the bulk of the SBIR funds to the most promising of these projects.

Firms believed that the long delays—sometimes two years or more—between the original application and the receipt of the Phase II funds often had a detrimental effect on their ability to commercialize technologies. Because of the characteristics of high-technology firms discussed earlier, these delays often made it difficult for the firm to sustain its innovative effort or to commercialize its findings.

As public venture capital programs have increased in number, policy makers and economists increasingly are grappling with the question of how to assess these programs. Not only do substantial divisions exist between the approaches employed by academics and practitioners, but there is little consensus within the academic community itself about the best evaluation methodologies.

In this section, we review some of the most frequently encountered approaches and discuss their strengths and limitations. The approaches most frequently employed by practitioners have the virtue of being relatively straightforward to implement and communicate. One approach—utilized by many agencies when examining their SBIR programs—has been to highlight successful firms.

These approaches have important limitations. First, many awardees may have a stake in the programs that have funded them, and consequently feel inclined to give favorable answers i. This may be a particular problem in the case of the SBIR initiative. General Accounting Office , , Second, in other cases, the results may be biased the other way: Firms may be unwilling to acknowledge that they received important benefits from participating in public programs, lest they attract unwelcome attention.

Third, in many cases, it may simply be very difficult to identify the marginal contribution of a public venture capital award, which may be one of many sources of financing that a firm employed to develop a given technology. The approaches employed by academics have important limitations as well. The most common approach is to examine in a regression framework the marginal impact of public funding on private research spending. Studies of federal technology programs by academic economists, beginning with Levy and Terleckyj , have tended to focus on the short-run effects of these efforts.

In theory, these frameworks should be applicable to the assessment of public venture capital programs. An analysis along these lines is undertaken by Wallsten He examines whether the SBIR program managers may select firms with too high a probability of success. Every dollar of SBIR funding awards is likely to lead to a reduction of about one dollar of private research spending by the awardee firm.

To remain true to its original purpose, Wallsten therefore recommends a restructuring of SBIR policy to fund marginal firms whose commercial success is less certain. However valuable a framework it may be when examining the macroeconomic impact of public expenditures, it is less clear that this econometric approach is appropriate when assessing public efforts to assist small high-technology firms. In many cases, small high-technology firms are organized around one key scientist or engineer and his research laboratory or product development team.

It may well be rational for a firm not to increase its rate of spending, but rather to use the funds to prolong the time before it needs to seek additional capital. To interpret such a short-run reduction in other research spending as a negative signal is very problematic. A second academic approach is to examine the long-run impact of participation in public venture capital programs on the growth of the firms themselves, relative to a matched set of firms.

In this way, it is possible to assess whether either superior firms were selected for the program or participation in the program was associated with ultimate success, although disentangling the two effects, as discussed later, is challenging.

In the context of the SBIR program, Lerner analyzes the growth of 1, SBIR awardees and matching firms over a year period and documents that the awardees appear to have superior employment growth. This approach also has some important limitations. Most fundamentally, policy makers should seek to maximize social, not private, returns.

If the growth of the SBIR awardees is merely at the expense of their rivals, the impact of the program on public welfare is likely to be minimal. Second, even the measures of private benefits that can be employed are imperfect. Ideally, the increase in firm value would be measured. Unfortunately, over 98 percent of the firms were privately held at the time of their first SBIR award. Consequently, assessing the valuation and profitability of these awards is very difficult.

Finally, it is difficult to disentangle whether the superior performance of the awardees is due to the selection of better firms or the positive impact of the awards. Lerner tries to address this issue in a supplemental analysis using the following argument: Firms whose key assets are intangible intellectual property are much harder for outside investors to evaluate using traditional financial measures.

If SBIR awards are certifying firm quality to outside investors, then these signals may be particularly valuable in these industries. SBIR awards should then be more strongly associated with firm growth in high-technology industries. An alternative hypothesis is that federal officials are selecting firms likely to grow rapidly, even without public subsidies. Though the insights of federal officials may give them a greater insight relative to that of other investors and thus make a signal more valuable , it is by no means certain that it is easier to select successful firms in these industries.

Empirical studies suggest that predicting success is much more difficult in high-technology industries. This suggests the reverse pattern: SBIR awards should be more correlated with firm growth in low-technology industries. Consistent with the certification hypothesis, he finds that the relationship between SBIR awards and growth is much stronger in high-technology industries. Akerlof, G. Barry, C. Becker, G. Bolton, P. Brav, A. Cohen, L. Noll, eds.

The Technology Pork Barrel. Washington, D. Eisinger, P. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. Fenn, G. Liang, and S. The Economics of the Private Equity Market. Freear, J. Wetzel, Jr. Gompers, P. The Venture Cycle. Cambridge, Mass. Good, M. Photocopy, U. Greenwald, B. Stiglitz, and A. Griliches, Z. Hall, B. Investment and research and development: Does the source of financing matter? Working Paper No. Hao, K. Himmelberg, C. Hubbard, R. Huntsman, B. Hoban, Jr. Irwin, D.

Jaffe, A. Economic analysis of research spillovers—Implications for the Advanced Technology Program. National Institute of Standards and Technology. Jensen, M. Jewkes, J. Sawers, and R. The Sources of Invention. New York: St. Krugman, P. Geography and Trade.

Lerner, J. Lerner, Josh. July, v. Levy, D. Liles, P. Sustaining the Venture Capital Firm. Mansfield, E. Rapoport, A. Romeo, S. Wagner, and G. Myers, S. Stern, and M. Nelson, C. Noone, C. Chicago: Capital Publishing. Paris: OECD. Olson, M. The Logic of Collective Action. Peltzman, S. Price Waterhouse. Survey of small high-tech businesses shows Federal SBIR awards spurring job growth, commercial sales. Saxenian, A. Government Printing Office and earlier years. Sparkman, J.

Government Printing Office. Stigler, G. Stiglitz, J. Congressional Budget Office. General Accounting Office. Washington, DC: U. Venture Economics. Existing Venture Capital Investments. Wellesley, MA: Venture Economics. San Francisco: VentureOne. Wallsten, S. The Small Business Innovation Research program: Encouraging technological innovation and commercialization in small firms? Working paper, Stanford University, Stanford, Calif.

Collectively, the commissioned papers and the findings and recommendations represent a significant contribution to our understanding of the SBIR program. Based on feedback from you, our users, we've made some improvements that make it easier than ever to read thousands of publications on our website. Jump up to the previous page or down to the next one. Also, you can type in a page number and press Enter to go directly to that page in the book.

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Besides, you may also have to write it as a stand-alone assignment. Drafting a strong literature review is considered as the foundation of any research. It helps to evaluate existing research and tells your teacher how your research is relevant to the respective field. Moreover, it also discusses new insights that your research will contribute to the field of study.

Thus, a writer needs to be well prepared to utilize multiple scholarly sources to find the required research material. An organizational plan must also be developed to combine both the summary and synthesis of the previous literature. Keep on reading this complete guide to learning how to write a literature review paper in simple steps. A literature review is the research and evaluation of the available literature in your chosen topic area.

It includes a survey of scholarly sources to provide an overview of the current research and available data and knowledge. These sources include books, journal articles, and newspapers, that relate to your research question. Moreover, it not only summarizes the sources. But it also analyzes, interprets, and evaluates the relevant theories, methods, points of view, and gaps in the existing literature.

However, this does not mean that a literature review is based on previous searches only. The writer discusses the research question and its various aspects and discusses the relevant study to support this claim. Some of the key reasons to add a literature review into your research paper, thesis, and dissertation include:.

The length of a literature review usually depends on the length of the research project. For example, if you are writing a research paper of 10 pages. You will have to include 5 to 6 sources in your literature review. However, consulting with the professor about proper requirements beforehand is a better way to avoid any last-minute issues.

Writing a literature review for a research paper requires you to search for literature. It should be relevant to your research problem and questions. Similarly, use the keywords to search for different sources. However, for writing a review as a stand-alone assignment, develop a research question that gives direction to your search.

Such a question must be answered without gathering original data. Instead, you should answer it by reviewing the existing material. Furthermore, create a list of keywords related to the topic and research question. Find useful articles and check for the reference list to come up with more authentic sources.

You probably would not be able to cover everything on the chosen topic. Thus, begin by reading the abstract to identify whether the article is relevant or not. Also, take enough time to evaluate the sources. Make a list of citations and ensure there are no repetitive authors, articles, or publications in the literature review. Obviously, it is impossible to read each and every single thing written about the research topic.

Instead, you have to analyze the sources that are most relevant to your research questions. Make sure you are using credible and authentic sources. Also, read the important publications and articles to justify your argument. Moreover, the scope of the literature review largely depends on the topic and discipline. For example, science students only evaluate recent literary work to write their reviews.

Nevertheless, the humanities students also have to study and discuss the historical research and perspective about the topic. Begin the writing process along with searching and reading the relevant sources. Note down important information to use in the text of your literature review. It is better to cite your sources at this stage to avoid the risk of plagiarism. Moreover, it can also help in developing an annotated bibliography.

Start organizing the argument and structure of a literature review. For this, you have to identify the connection between the sources that are used while writing an abstract. There are various approaches that can be used to organize the literature review. Depending upon the length, it can follow a chronological, thematic, methodological, or theoretical framework. It is the simplest approach to structure your literature review. However, do not just summarize and list the sources.

Instead, analyze the critical debates, research, and patterns that have shaped the direction of the field. Also, discuss your interpretation of the developments. This type of approach helps to organize the review into subsections. Each section will discuss a different aspect of the chosen topic. It helps to compare the outcomes of gathering sources from different research methods.

It may include the analysis of:. A literature review is often used to discuss various theories and key concepts. By using this approach, you can argue the relevance of a particular theoretical method. Similarly, you can also combine different theories to make a new framework for your research. Like any other academic paper, a literature review format must have three sections: introduction, body section, and a conclusion.

What to include in each section depends on the aims and objectives of your literature review. If your literature review is part of your thesis or dissertation, restate the research question. Similarly, briefly summarize the whole context by highlighting literature gaps. If you are writing a standalone literature review, provide background information on the topic.

Also, discuss the scope of the literature and your research objectives. You must then be able to apply what you know about the test to your thesis. And then comes the hard part. You must be able to find credible sources and experts in the industry who back up your beliefs, while still putting a unique spin on the idea. Want your voice to count in?

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This literature review is a collection of current academic this type of research which, in turn, will facilitate the integration of ESG factors into. Literature review about “responsible investing” (ESG and others) performance have differences: the number and type of categories may appear fairly. Eight rules for writing an attractive title - Seven key sentences to write a good abstract - How to structure your literature review.